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1	Q:	Re: Brattle Group Report, pages 36-37.
2 3		Citation
3 4		Citation:
4 5		We have four recommendations concerning the proposed NAD.
5 6		We have four recommendations concerning the proposed NAP:
0 7		1. We recommend modifying the NAP to more completely reflect
8		the goal of cost causation. We recommend that new and
9		requesting load over a size threshold be given a choice to either
10		pay for the necessary network upgrades or choose an
11		interruptible rate. Specifically, we recommend the following
12		high-level choices:
13		8
14		• Option A: Be financially responsible for the network
15		upgrades that exceed the customers' anticipated revenues
16		over some fixed period and providing security equal to the
17		anticipated revenues;
18		
19		or
20		
21		• Option B: Adopt an interruptible rate, which avoids those
22		transmission costs. This choice requires assessing the
23		appropriate level of curtailability/interruptibility to ensure
24		that existing customers do not experience any reduction in the
25		current reliability level.
26		
27		Preamble:
28		
29		Recommendations 2 through 4 apply only to customers that choose
30		"Option A" from Recommendation 1.
31		
32		a) Would Brattle agree that it is in fact making a single primary
33		recommendation; namely, "that new and requesting load over a size
34		threshold be given a choice to either pay for the necessary network
35		upgrades or choose an interruptible rate", and that the remaining
36		recommendations provide additional detail regarding this primary
37		recommendation? If not, please explain how Recommendations 2-4 could
38		be implemented if Recommendation 1 is not retained by the Board.

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1	b) Is the Brattle Group's recommendation to modify "the NAP to more
2	completely reflect the goal of cost causation" limited to the addition of the
3	choice between Option A and Option B (Recommendation #1), and the
4	additional recommendations for those that choose Option A
5	(Recommendations #2 through #4)? More specifically, please indicate
6	whether the Brattle Group also recommends adopting, modifying or
7	eliminating each of the following elements of Hydro's NAP as described in
8	sections IV.B. and V.A. of the Brattle Group report:
9	
10	i. The "banking" implicit in Hydro's proposed Upstream Capacity
11	Charge;
12	
13	ii. The revenue-based investment credit, offered to industrial
14	customers only; and
15	
16	iii. The benefit for reductions to expected unserved energy (EUE),
17	based on the approximate cost of projected gas turbine fuel use.
18	
19	c) For Option B, how would Brattle recommend addressing a situation where
20	the level of curtailability/interruptibility required to ensure that existing
21	customers do not experience any reduction in the current reliability level
22	changes over time? Assume, for example, that at the time the new customer
23	comes on line, curtailment over 300 hours per year is sufficient to avoid the
24	need for new transmission resources, but that, ten years later, the peak
25	period has broadened such that, without curtailment, available
26	transmission capacity would be exceeded during 310 hours. Should the
27	curtailment requirements be reassessed periodically, or set in stone when
28	the customer is first accepted for service?
29	
30	d) Is the Brattle Group explicitly recommending that the choice between
31	Option A and Option B be mandatory for all loads "over a size threshold",
32	or is it open to the possibility that this choice should only be required of
33	certain categories of loads?
34	
35	e) Does the term "network upgrades" in Brattle Group Recommendation #1
36	(choose between Option A and Option B) refer only to the transmission
37	system, or might it also include upgrade costs related to the distribution
38	system, above and beyond any such costs that could be directly assigned to
39	the new customer? If the former, how does the Brattle Group propose that

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1 2 3			existing customers be protected from additional distribution system costs resulting from a new customer?
4	1	ዋን	Please indicate the types of customers covered by the network upgrade policies
5	J	.,	described in section III of the Brattle Group report, for each of the six
6			Canadian jurisdictions and the US federal jurisdiction surveyed,
7			distinguishing between: transmission (wheeling) customers, industrial
8			customers taking service at transmission vs. distribution voltages,
9			cryptocurrency customers and other retail customers.
10			
11	A.		a) Yes, we agree.
12			
13			b)
14			i) The Upstream Capacity Charge as proposed by Hydro is not based on a
15			"but for" analysis. Brattle recommends that the Board adopt a "but
16			for"analysis approach.
17			
18			Concerning the "banking" approach embedded within the Hydro
19			proposed NAP, as stated on page 35 of the Brattle Report, "Looked at it
20			another way, the Upstream Capacity Charge is not tied to the actual
21			costs that Hydro incurs to upgrade the network charge to accommodate
22			the request of the cost-causing customer. It serves as a form of
23			"banking," essentially lending Hydro the money until it makes the
24 25			upgrades. We find this approach uncommon in our review of regulatory jurisdictions, not in line with our view of cost causation principles and
23 26			complicating the problem needlessly. [emphasis added]"
20 27			complicating the problem needlessiy: [emphasis added]
28			ii) Brattle recommends that the NAP be applied in a non-discriminatory
29			manner. As stated in Figure 1 on page 7 of the Brattle Report in the row
30			"Credit for Anticipated Revenues" the Brattle recommends crediting the
31			customer for anticipated revenues "with security provided to ensure
32			no harm to existing customers if the new customer exits the system
33			before producing the credit for revenues."
34			
35			iii) As shown in Figure 1 on page 7 of the Brattle Report in the row
36			"Inclusion of Reliability Benefits" the we recommend that reliability
37			benefits not be included, "No, cost causation should be the guiding
38			principle. Hydro's approach to calculating reliability benefits is non-
39			standard"

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1 2	c)	The terms and conditions for curtailment should be specified in the applicable tariff. We believe it would be appropriate to re-assess the terms and conditions
3		in the tariff periodically to ensure that reliability levels to existing customers
4		are maintained to the standards approved by the Board.
5		
6	d)	Please refer to the response in LAB-PUB-001 part a.
7		
8	e)	Please refer to the response in LAB-PUB-005 part c.
9		
10	f)	Please refer to the response in LAB-PUB-001 part d.