

1 **Q. Evidence, page 44, line 22 to page 45, line 23. Explain how the non-**
2 **materialization of risks should be considered by the Board in determining the**
3 **equity component in the capital structure and the ROE for Newfoundland**
4 **Power.**

5
6 A. This is a very good question meaning it is difficult to answer! What Dr. Booth can
7 say is that since his first appearance as an expert financial witness in 1986 he has
8 repeatedly been confronted by witnesses on behalf of a utility proposing risks that
9 have never materialized. For example, before the National Energy Board one
10 witness proposed that the TransCanada Mainline was risky since it ran full, that is
11 100% load, so the load could only drop meaning it was risky. Then a few years later
12 it was argued that the Mainline was risky because the load was not 100% and as a
13 result was less competitive with a volatile load. Clearly the implication was that
14 whatever the Mainline's load it was risky. This is why Dr. Booth places great store
15 on the history of a utility earning its allowed ROE as that qualifies the validity of
16 prior assessments of utility risk. If any of these "risk assessments" had been valid
17 then the utility at some point would be expected to have had problems earning its
18 allowed ROE. In terms of future risk, he accepts the judgment of the Ontario Energy
19 Board (EB-2011-0354):

20
21 *"Regarding the risk of future events, the Board agrees with CCC that the*
22 *relevant future risks are those that are likely to affect Enbridge in the near*
23 *term. Any risks that may materialize over the longer term can be taken into*
24 *account in subsequent proceedings. In considering the risk of future events,*
25 *the Board will take into account the fact that, generally, the more distant the*
26 *potential event, the more speculative is any conclusion on the likelihood that*
27 *the risk will materialize."*

28
29 Essentially the OEB is simply stating that it deals with problems as they arise, which
30 is the regulatory dynamic in Canada to protect the utility, and will not address
31 "speculative" risks. Invariably when such risks do arise they are allocated to the
32 ratepayer through the operation of deferral accounts and not to the account of the
33 shareholder. In this sense many of the risks advanced by witnesses for the utility as
34 a utility risk invariably end up being borne by the ratepayers should they actually
35 materialize.