

**WHENEVER. WHEREVER.
We'll be there.**



HAND DELIVERED

December 23, 2013

Board of Commissioners
of Public Utilities
P.O. Box 21040
120 Torbay Road
St. John's, NL A1A 5B2

Attention: G. Cheryl Blundon
Director of Corporate Services
and Board Secretary

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Re: Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro - Amended General Rate Application

Please find enclosed the original and 12 copies of Newfoundland Power's Submission in relation to the above-noted Application.

For convenience, the Submission is provided on three-hole punched paper.

A copy of this letter, together with enclosures, has been forwarded directly to the parties listed below.

If you have any questions regarding the enclosed, please contact the undersigned at your convenience.

Yours very truly,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Gerard M. Hayes".

Gerard M. Hayes
Senior Counsel

Enclosures

WHENEVER. WHEREVER.
We'll be there.



c. Geoffrey Young
Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro

Thomas Johnson, QC
O'Dea Earle Law Offices

Paul Coxworthy
Stewart McKelvey

Thomas O'Reilly, QC
Vale Newfoundland and Labrador Limited

Dennis Browne, QC
Miller & Hearn

Yvonne Jones, MP
Labrador

Senwung Luk
Olthuis, Kleer, Townshend LLP

Genevieve Dawson
Nunatsiavut Government

**Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro
2013 General Rate Application - Amended**

**Written Submissions
of Newfoundland Power**

December 23, 2015

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1 **A. INTRODUCTION**

2 **A.1 The Original Application**

3 On July 30, 2013, Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro (“Hydro”) filed a General Rate
4 Application (the “Original Application”) seeking, among other things, approval by the Board of
5 new customer rates, effective January 1, 2014, based on a 2013 Test Year. The Original
6 Application was the first general rate application filed by Hydro since 2006.

7
8 The projected wholesale rate impact for Newfoundland Power was an average decrease in the base
9 rates of 4.8%; including an average decrease of 3.2% for end consumers and rural customers.

10 **Reference:** *Original Application; Finance; Schedule III, page 1 of 2; Finance; Schedule I,*
11 *page 4 of 11.*

12
13 Following public notice of the Application, the Board issued Order No. P.U. 28 (2013) on
14 September 19, 2013, which set out the schedule of dates and procedures for the hearing of the
15 Original Application. This Order established a detailed schedule providing for: review of the
16 Application by Grant Thornton, the Board’s financial consultants; written interrogation of the
17 Application by intervenors; filing of evidence by intervenors; Board facilitated negotiations; and
18 a public hearing, all in accordance with established Board practice.

19
20 In June of 2014, one month prior to the scheduled public hearing of the Original Application,
21 Hydro advised the Board of its intention to file an amended general rate application, citing the
22 need to “update the financial information to provide a more current and relevant basis for rate
23 setting purposes.” Settlement negotiations and the public hearing were postponed.

24 **Reference:** *Hydro letter to the Board dated June 6, 2014.*

1 **A.2 The Amended Application**

2 On November 10, 2014, Hydro filed its amended general rate application (the “Amended
3 Application”). In addition to proposing new rates based on a 2015 Test Year, the Amended
4 Application proposes that the Board also test costs for 2014 for purposes of addressing a forecast
5 net income deficiency of \$45.9 million for that year (the “2014 Revenue Deficiency”).

6
7 The Amended Application included a number of other proposals which varied substantially from
8 those included in the Original Application including, but not limited to, issues related to rate
9 design and cost of service methodologies. These changes included a new Hydro proposal to
10 change the methodology for the allocation of the Rural Deficit, which would have the effect of
11 shifting a greater portion of the costs to Newfoundland Power’s customers.

12
13 The wholesale rate impact for Newfoundland Power of the Amended Application was a 4.1%
14 increase, as compared to the 4.8% decrease proposed in the Original Application. The estimated
15 average rate impact on end consumers of the proposals in the Amended Application was a 2.8%
16 increase, as compared to a 3.2% decrease in the Original Application.¹

17
18 **A.3 Process**

19 Eight intervenors representing diverse interests participated in the hearing process for the
20 Original Application and the Amended Application. The Board and intervenors issued a total of
21 over 2,000 requests for information to Hydro.

¹ The percentage change in these customers’ base rates is in comparison with existing rates. The relative increase in comparison to the rates proposed in the Original Application is 6%.

1 The public hearing of the Amended Application commenced on September 9, 2015 and
2 concluded on December 3, 2015 after a total of 42 hearing days.

3
4 During the course of the public hearing, Hydro witnesses undertook to respond to a total of 192
5 questions they could not immediately answer or to provide other information that was not readily
6 available. As late as December 17, 2015, Hydro continued to file revised responses to requests
7 for information and written undertakings.

8 9 **A.4 Settled Issues**

10 As a result of Board facilitated negotiations, a Settlement Agreement with respect to certain
11 matters raised in the Amended Application was reached on August 14, 2015 between Hydro, the
12 Consumer Advocate, Newfoundland Power, the Industrial Customer Group, Vale and Board
13 staff.

14
15 The settled issues included (i) Hydro's allowed range of return on rate base; (ii) certain
16 accounting matters related to the 2014 Revenue Deficiency and the 2015 Test Year Revenue
17 Requirement; (iii) certain cost of service issues; (iv) the rate design for Industrial Customers; (v)
18 allocation of the year-to-date net load variations in the RSP in the event the load variation is
19 maintained as an element of the RSP; (vi) deferral and recovery mechanisms for Conservation
20 and Demand Management and approved hearing costs; (vii) continuation of the generation credit
21 agreement between Hydro and Corner Brook Pulp and Paper Limited on a pilot basis; (viii) a
22 wheeling rate; (ix) the implications of Hydro's Customer Service Strategic Roadmap 2015-2017;
23 (x) Hydro's obligation to continue reporting on key performance indicators; (xi) Hydro's

1 obligation to complete various studies related to the Labrador-Island interconnection; and (xii)
2 the timing of Hydro's next GRA filing.

3 **Reference:** *Consent 1.*

4

5 Following commencement of the public hearing, a Supplemental Settlement Agreement was
6 agreed by the parties. Matters agreed in the Supplemental Settlement Agreement included (i)
7 most of the remaining cost of service issues (save and except for the methodologies for
8 allocation of the Rural Deficit and specifically assigned O&M charges); (ii) Newfoundland
9 Power's rate design; (iii) Hydro's proposed Conservation and Demand Management Cost
10 Recovery Adjustment; and (iv) Hydro's obligation to complete a cost of service methodology
11 review in 2016 on agreed terms.

12 **Reference:** *Consent 2.*

13

14 *Submission*

15 Newfoundland Power submits that, in its order on this Application, the Board should implement
16 the Settlement Agreement and the Supplemental Agreement.

1 **B. REGULATORY POLICY AND PROCESS**

2 **B.1 General Policy Framework**

3 The regulatory policy framework under which Hydro is regulated by the Board is established
4 primarily by the *Electrical Power Control Act, 1994* and the *Public Utilities Act*. That regulatory
5 policy framework requires the Board to balance the interests of Hydro and its customers in its
6 consideration of the Amended Application.

7
8 The *Public Utilities Act* defines the Board's powers in the regulation of public utilities in its
9 jurisdiction, including Hydro. In addition, the *Public Utilities Act* sets out the obligations and
10 rights of Hydro as a public utility providing a regulated service.

11
12 The *Public Utilities Act* provides for the Board's general supervision of Hydro's utility
13 operations (s.16) and, amongst other things, requires the Board to specifically approve rates
14 (s.70), capital expenditures (s.41) and the issue of securities (s.91).

15
16 Hydro has an obligation under the *Public Utilities Act* to provide service to all who require it
17 (s.54) and to ensure that its service and facilities are reasonably safe and adequate (s.37). This
18 obligation is commonly referred to as the "obligation to serve".

19
20 Section 80 of the *Public Utilities Act* entitles Hydro to the opportunity to earn annually a just and
21 reasonable return on its rate base in addition to recovering its reasonable and prudent operating
22 expenses.

1 The *Electrical Power Control Act, 1994* sets out the electrical power policy of the province.

2 The electrical power policy of the province deals specifically with rates [s. 3(a)] and

3 management of utility resources [s.3(b)].

4

5 Section 3 (a) of the *Electrical Power Control Act, 1994* provides, in part, as follows:

6 “3. *It is declared to be the policy of the province that*

7 (a) *the rates to be charged, either generally or under specific contracts,*
8 *for the supply of power within the province*

9 (i) *should be reasonable and not unjustly discriminatory,*

10 (ii) *should be established, wherever practicable, based on forecast*
11 *costs for that supply of power for 1 or more years,*

12 (iii) *should provide sufficient revenue to the producer or retailer of*
13 *the power to enable it to earn a just and reasonable return as*
14 *construed under the Public Utilities Act so that it is able to*
15 *achieve and maintain a sound credit rating in the financial*
16 *markets of the world, ... ”.*

17

18 Section 3 (b) of the *Electrical Power Control Act, 1994* provides, in part, as follows:

19 “3. *It is declared to be the policy of the province that*

20 (b) *all sources and facilities for the production, transmission and*
21 *distribution of power in the province should be managed and operated*
22 *in a manner*

23 (i) *that would result in the most efficient production, transmission*
24 *and distribution of power,*

25 (ii) *that would result in consumers in the province having equitable*
26 *access to an adequate supply of power,*

27 (iii) *that would result in power being delivered to consumers in the*
28 *province at the lowest possible cost consistent with reliable*
29 *service, ... ”.*

30

31 The electrical power policy of the province encapsulates the interests of both Hydro and the

32 consumers of Hydro’s electricity service, which the Board must balance in its consideration of

33 the Amended Application. On the one hand, the electrical power policy entitles Hydro to charge

34 rates that will provide it with an opportunity to earn a just and reasonable return. On the other

1 hand, it obliges Hydro at all times to operate efficiently, so it is able to provide a reliable supply
2 of power to all of its customers consistent with the “least cost” standard.

3

4 **B.2 Regulatory Balance**

5 The balance contained in the regulatory policy framework in this province has been recognized
6 by the Board on a number of occasions including in Order No. P.U. 32 (2007), where the Board
7 observed:

8 *“The real challenge for the Board, in keeping with its legislative mandate, is to*
9 *balance oftentimes competing objectives within the regulatory environment to*
10 *ensure a set of sound and reasoned decisions serving the interests of both*
11 *customer and utility alike.”*
12

13 **Reference:** *Order No. P.U. 32 (2007), Appendix A, Page 8.*

14

15 **B.3 Evidentiary Considerations**

16 The Board is legally required to determine issues on the basis of the evidence before it. In this
17 proceeding, the onus is on Hydro to prove that its management of its facilities has been prudent
18 and that the costs it seeks to recover from customers through rates are reasonable. Hydro has
19 acknowledged and accepted that burden of proof.

20 **Reference:** *Transcript, September 23, 2015, page 112, line 23 to page 113, line 21.*

21

22 The size of the record of this proceeding, and the breadth and complexity of the issues, presents
23 challenges. Firstly, the extensive body of evidence before the Board presents numerous
24 instances of conflicting information. This raises concerns as to the reliability of the evidence, in
25 particular, the financial information provided by Hydro. In addition to such inconsistencies in

1 the record, evidence presented during the public hearing disclosed significant differences
2 between test year forecasts and actual experience in 2014 and 2015. This raises questions
3 regarding the reasonableness of Hydro’s test year forecasts. While some degree of variance is to
4 be expected due to the inherent imprecision of a forecast, a test year is intended to reasonably
5 represent the utility’s costs.

6
7 Hydro acknowledged that the utility is at the risk of variances between test year costs and actual
8 costs when actual costs are higher. This is consistent with the principle that the utility is not
9 entitled to recover from customers any costs not proven to be reasonable.

10 **Reference:** *Transcript, October 7, 2015, page 96, lines 10-24.*

11
12 Hydro is asking the Board to depart from generally accepted regulatory practice in the
13 determination of Hydro’s rate base for rate setting purposes to provide it with an opportunity to
14 earn “the appropriate return” in 2016, the first year in which rates to be established in this
15 proceeding will apply. This suggests the 2015 test year forecast may not provide an appropriate
16 basis for prospective rate setting. Meanwhile, Hydro has chosen not to update its test year
17 forecasts.

18 **Reference:** *Transcript, November 19, 2015, page 67, line 18 to page 72, line 10.*

19
20 Hydro is the custodian of its financial information and accounting resources. It is accountable
21 for the evidence it presents and for its conduct of the Amended Application. Where substantial
22 questions arise as a result of conflicting evidence on the record, such questions should be
23 resolved in favour of Hydro’s customers. Where it is proposed that the Board depart from

1 generally accepted regulatory practice, such proposals should be supported by expert regulatory
2 evidence.

3

4 **B.4 Context of the Amended Application**

5 ***B.4.1 General***

6 In its consideration of the Amended Application, the Board’s principal task is to determine
7 whether the substantial increases in Hydro’s costs since 2007 are reasonable based on the
8 evidence presented, and whether they provide a reasonable basis for regulatory decision making.
9 The Board’s determinations will be made against the backdrop of Hydro’s declining service
10 reliability, which became especially evident following the supply issues and customer outages
11 experienced in January 2014. Since its last rate proceeding, Hydro has undergone major
12 organizational changes, largely related to the creation of the energy corporation now known as
13 Nalcor Energy (“Nalcor”).

14

15 ***B.4.2 The Changing Organizational Structure***

16 In 2008, a new Crown corporation was established to take a lead role in the development of the
17 Province’s energy resources. Hydro is now a 100% owned subsidiary of Nalcor. Nalcor and
18 Hydro share personnel through a matrix organizational model, which provides the ability to share
19 costs and resources among Hydro, Nalcor and Nalcor’s non-regulated lines of business. Hydro’s
20 management decision-making in the context of this matrix organizational model was a prominent
21 focus of the public hearing of the Amended Application.

22 **Reference:** *Amended Application, Volume I, page 3.39, lines 17-24.*

1 The evidence shows that the introduction of the matrix organizational model has influenced
2 decision making and the sharing of resources among Hydro and its affiliates. Hydro's
3 management decisions in relation to system operations and maintenance is an issue in this
4 proceeding.

5
6 In Newfoundland Power's submission, the evidence in this proceeding related to lines of
7 authority and accountability at Hydro lacks clarity. The coincidence of this lack of clarity with
8 major increases in Hydro's costs and worsening service reliability indicate that management
9 performance should continue to be a focus of the Board's regulatory supervision of Hydro.

10

11 ***B.4.3 Operating Efficiency***

12 The Amended Application contains proposals for the recovery of costs from Hydro's customers,
13 including Newfoundland Power. Hydro's executive and management witnesses testified that
14 Hydro has maintained reasonable control over its controllable costs. The evidence is not
15 consistent with that assertion.

16 ***Reference:*** *Transcript, September 23, 2015, page 113, line 22 to page 115, line 20.*

17

18 The evidence indicates that Hydro's costs have increased well beyond inflationary levels since
19 Hydro's 2007 general rate application. Hydro's operations and maintenance ("O&M") costs
20 have increased by 47.9% since 2007. Total O&M costs in Hydro's 2015 Test Year costs have
21 increased by \$44.8 million over the 2007 Test Year. This is a 33.2% increase on an inflation
22 adjusted basis. Gross Salaries have increased by 43.3% on an inflation adjusted basis over the
23 same period.

1 **Reference:** *Amended Application, Volume I, page 1.13R, Table 2; Responses to Requests for*
2 *Information NP-NLH-315; and NP-NLH-314.*
3

4 The evidence is not consistent with the exercise of reasonable control by Hydro over its
5 controllable costs. Hydro's 2014 forecast O&M costs were 12.7% higher than the 2013 actual
6 costs, and the 2014 actual costs exceeded forecast by a further 5%. O&M Costs for the 2015
7 Test Year were initially forecast to increase an additional 9% over the 2014 forecast; however,
8 by August of 2015, a revised forecast indicated further increases by year end.

9 **Reference:** *Responses to Requests for Information NP-NLH-315; NP-NLH-307, Revision 1,*
10 *Attachment 1, page 9, line 36; Undertaking 55, Attachment 2.*
11

12 In Order No. P.U. 7 (2002-2003), arising out of Hydro's 2001 general rate application, the Board
13 stated that "the onus is on [Hydro] to bring forward performance measures which clearly
14 demonstrate the efficiency of its operations." At that time, the Board determined that Hydro had
15 not demonstrated the efficiency of its operations, and imposed a productivity allowance on
16 Hydro of \$2.0 million.

17 **Reference:** *Order No. P.U. 7 (2002-2003), page 73.*
18

19 The evidence of Hydro's executive and management witnesses is that no specific performance
20 measures or directed programs have been implemented by Hydro to improve or measure
21 efficiency. Instead, Hydro claims its productivity efforts are built in to the annual budgeting
22 process and its efforts to try to take advantage of opportunities as they arise. Hydro was unable
23 to identify any specific areas where operating costs have been significantly reduced as a result of
24 such efforts.

25 **Reference:** *Transcript, September 10, 2015, pages 1-4; Transcript, September 16, 2015, page*
26 *155, line 22 to page 168 line 7; Transcript, September 22, page 88, line 7 to page*

1 92, line 3; Transcript, September 24, 2014, pages 128-140; Transcript November
2 16, page 147, line 17 to page 152, line 8.
3

4 In its consideration of the Amended Application, the Board must determine whether the
5 increases in costs indicated by Hydro’s proposed 2014 and 2015 test year revenue requirements
6 are reasonable and consistent with those of an efficiently-run electrical utility. In Newfoundland
7 Power’s submission, Hydro has not presented evidence of this.

8
9 These written submissions recommend specific cost reductions and disallowances in Hydro’s
10 2014 and 2015 test years. Detailed submissions supporting these recommendations are set out in
11 Sections C and D.

12
13 ***B.4.4 Service Reliability***

14 The increases in Hydro’s costs since 2007 have taken place in a period during which there has
15 been a decline in the reliability of the service Hydro provides to its customers. Following the
16 supply issues and service interruptions of January 2014, the Board initiated an investigation of
17 the causes of the widespread electricity outages experienced by customers on the Island
18 Interconnected system (the “Supply Issues Investigation”).

19
20 The Board’s preliminary report on the Supply Issues Investigation concluded that the outages
21 were caused or contributed to by a number of decisions and failures by Hydro. In particular, the
22 Board found that “the number and nature of equipment failures that occurred is unusual, raising
23 questions as to Hydro’s operation and maintenance of its equipment...”. The preliminary report

1 of the Board’s consultant, The Liberty Consulting Group (“Liberty”), found that “a continuing
2 and unacceptably high risk” of outages remains for 2015-2017.

3 **Reference:** *The Board’s Interim Report dated May 15, 2014, pages 25-26; Liberty Interim*
4 *Report dated April 24, 2014, page 4.*
5

6 The Supply Issues Investigation is ongoing. During the course of Phase One of the Supply
7 Issues Investigation, the Board imposed certain detailed reporting obligations on Hydro. The
8 Board continues to require reporting in relation to accuracy of load forecasting and winter
9 readiness. Hydro has also committed to filing an annual report with the board on generation
10 adequacy.

11 **Reference:** *Board letter to Hydro dated August 14, 2015 as to load forecasting accuracy*
12 *reporting, and October 8, 2015 as to winter readiness reporting. Hydro letter to*
13 *the Board dated September 16, 2015 as to generation adequacy reporting.*
14

15 Hydro should remain subject to those detailed reporting requirements until the Board is satisfied
16 that the unacceptably high risk of outages on the Island Interconnected system is not a concern.

17
18 Phase Two of the Supply Issues Investigation is anticipated to conclude in 2016. This phase of
19 the investigation is focused on reliability on the Island Interconnected system following the
20 interconnection with Muskrat Falls. Newfoundland Power will file with the Board its detailed
21 submissions regarding future reliability of supply on the Island Interconnected system in that
22 proceeding.

23

24 ***B.4.5 The Prudence Review***

25 In February 2015, as part of its investigation and review of the Amended Application, the Board
26 retained Liberty to provide expert assistance relating to a prudence review undertaken by the

1 Board relating to certain actions and decisions taken by Hydro and whether associated costs are
2 to be recovered from Hydro’s customers (the “Prudence Review”). The Prudence Review was
3 formally constituted as a separate procedure within the public hearing of the Amended
4 Application. Liberty’s review culminated in a finding that Hydro’s decisions and actions were
5 imprudent in relation to 7 of the 11 specific programs and projects under review.

6
7 In its consideration of the Amended Application, the Board must consider whether Hydro’s
8 management decision-making has been prudent and has resulted in the provision to Hydro’s
9 customers of electrical service that is consistent with the electrical power policy of the Province
10 and Hydro’s obligation to serve.

11
12 Newfoundland Power’s written submissions on the Prudence Review have been filed with the
13 Board in separate written submissions dated December 23, 2015. The written submissions on the
14 Prudence Review should be considered together with these written submissions.

15

16 **B.5 Regulatory Balance and the Amended Application**

17 In Newfoundland Power’s view, a general rate application to enable Hydro to rebalance its rates
18 with its costs is long overdue. However, Hydro should only recover those costs, forecast or
19 otherwise, which have been tested and proven to be reasonable in accordance with accepted
20 regulatory principles.

1 In assessing the entirety of the evidence and the submissions of the parties, the Board must
2 balance the interests of the utility and electricity consumers within the regulatory policy
3 framework described above.

4
5 In Newfoundland Power’s view, Hydro’s approach to test year forecasting and the presentation
6 of cost information in this proceeding has hindered a satisfactory understanding of Hydro’s costs.
7 As noted below, there are measures available to the Board to address shortcomings in the
8 evidence in the short term. However, as Hydro’s President and Chief Executive Officer has
9 testified, a mismatch between utility revenues and costs over the longer term can have serious
10 repercussions for the utility and its customers.

11 **Reference:** *Transcript, September 10, 2015, page 20, line 24 to page 23, line 9.*

12
13 Newfoundland Power’s submissions on costs, if accepted by the Board, would result in
14 significant adjustments to Hydro’s 2014 and 2015 test year revenue requirements. It is
15 Hydro’s evidence that any such adjustments would be recorded by Hydro in its 2016
16 financial results. On that basis, the adjustments recommended in these written
17 submissions would have implications for Hydro’s opportunity to earn a just and
18 reasonable return in 2016.

19 **Reference:** *Transcript, November 19, 2015, page 42, line 10 to page 45, line 11.*

20
21 The entitlement of a utility to earn a just and reasonable return has been described by the
22 Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal as follows:

23 *“[23] This statutory entitlement of the utility to earn a “just and reasonable”*
24 *return is the linguistic touchstone for the balancing exercise. This phrase*
25 *emphasizes the fairness aspect, both to the utility, in earning sufficient revenues*

1 *to make its continued investment worthwhile and to maintain its credit rating in*
2 *financial markets, and to the consumer, in obtaining adequate service at*
3 *reasonable rates. It also emphasizes the need for a tempering of each interest*
4 *group’s economic imperative by consideration of the interests of the other.*

5
6 *[24] Having said that, the entitlement of the utility to a fair return on its*
7 *investment is always regarded as of fundamental importance...”*

8
9 **Reference:** *Stated Case, Page 16, paragraphs 23 and 24.*

10
11 Highlighting the balance inherent in utility regulation, the Supreme Court of Canada in a recent
12 judgment determined that the entitlement of a public utility to a fair return is not absolute in all
13 circumstances. In upholding a decision of the Ontario Energy Board to disallow certain
14 operating costs of Ontario Power Generation (“OPG”), a public utility, the Court stated as
15 follows:

16 *“I have noted above that it is essential for a utility to earn its cost of capital in the*
17 *long run. The Board’s disallowance may have adversely impacted OPG’s ability to*
18 *earn its cost of capital in the short run. Nevertheless, the disallowance was*
19 *intended “to send a clear signal that OPG must take responsibility for improving*
20 *its performance”. (Board Decision, at p. 86). Such a signal may, in the short run,*
21 *provide the necessary impetus for OPG to bring its compensation cost in line with*
22 *what, in the Board’s opinion, consumers should justly expect to pay for an*
23 *efficiently provided service. Sending such a signal is consistent with the Board’s*
24 *market proxy role and its objectives under s. 1 of the Ontario Energy Board Act,*
25 *1998.”*

26
27 **Reference:** *Ontario (Energy Board) v. Ontario Power Generation Inc., 2015 SCC 44,*
28 *at paragraph 120.*
29

30 Newfoundland Power believes that the financial integrity of Hydro benefits customers. For that
31 reason, Hydro’s entitlement to an opportunity to earn a just and reasonable return should always
32 be a fundamental consideration for the Board. The Board’s decisions in this proceeding must
33 balance that consideration against the customers’ interest in receiving an efficiently provided
34 service.

1 These written submissions contain Newfoundland Power’s assessment of the evidence. In
2 Newfoundland Power’s submission, it is appropriate that costs judged by the Board to flow from
3 imprudent decisions not be borne by customers. It is also appropriate that costs not proven on
4 the evidence to be reasonable should not be recovered from customers.

5
6 On the basis of the Supreme Court of Canada’s recent statement of the law, it is within the
7 Board’s authority to order cost disallowances or adjustments to proposed revenue requirements
8 that could have an adverse impact on Hydro’s ability to earn its allowed rate of return *in the*
9 *short term* if such disallowance or adjustment, in the Board’s opinion, constitutes an appropriate
10 signal that Hydro must take responsibility for improving its performance.

11
12 The appropriateness of such a measure should be considered in light of the short time horizon in
13 which the Board’s determinations in this proceeding will apply. During negotiations prior to the
14 start of the hearing, it was agreed that Hydro will file its next general rate application, for rate
15 changes based on a 2018 test year, on or before March 30, 2017.

16 **Reference:** *Consent 1.*

17
18 The anticipated time between the Board’s order in this proceeding and Hydro’s filing of another
19 general rate application is just over a year. This provides time for Hydro to respond to the
20 Board’s order and provide evidence that demonstrates improvement in its performance.

21 Although challenges remain, there is evidence that Hydro has made progress.

1 In its report to the Board dated December 17, 2014, Liberty stated that Hydro has made
2 “substantial progress” in addressing its problems that contributed to transmission equipment
3 failures, in making recommended enhancements to its maintenance practices and in improving
4 program execution in identified areas of its asset management program.

5 **Reference:** *Liberty Consulting Group, Report on Island Interconnected System to*
6 *Interconnection with Muskrat Falls addressing Newfoundland and Labrador*
7 *Hydro, Executive Summary, ES-1 to ES-3.*
8

9 Liberty’s witnesses testified during the prudence segment of the public hearing that the work
10 Hydro has done since the commencement of the Supply Issues Investigation “has been
11 aggressive, commendable, the programs the instituted were extensive...important work remains,
12 but on balance, I think Hydro was very responsive to Liberty’s findings.”

13 **Reference:** *Transcript, November 12, 2015, page 124, lines 6-14.*
14

15 During the public hearing of the Amended Application, Hydro acknowledged the need to
16 improve its performance. At its next general rate application, the Board will have an opportunity
17 to assess whether it has made reasonable progress in that regard.

18 **Reference:** *Transcript, October 29, 2015, page 95, line 22 to page 99, line 6; Transcript,*
19 *October 30, 2015, page 123, line 3 to page 125, line 1.*

1 **C. COSTS FOR RATEMAKING PURPOSES**

2 **C.1 General**

3 Hydro's proposal for future rates is based on a forecast 2015 test year. 2015 is almost over.

4 Hydro has clearly indicated that it does not intend to adjust its test year forecast to reflect
5 updated information.

6

7 For many costs, the evidence simply does not support what is reflected in Hydro's test year. In
8 these instances, adjustments are required in order to ensure that electrical power is being
9 delivered to Hydro's customers "at the lowest possible cost consistent with reliable service."

10 **Reference:** *Electrical Power Control Act, 1994 SNL 1994, Ch. E-5.1, s. 3(b)(iii).*

11

12 In total, the required adjustments to Hydro's 2015 test year exceed \$100 million. The most
13 significant single required test year cost adjustment relates to Hydro's fuel costs.

14

15 In correspondence to the Board dated October 28, 2015, Hydro proposed to update its No. 6 fuel
16 and diesel production costs, as well as its diesel purchases, to reflect lower fuel costs. The
17 impact on Hydro's proposed test year fuel costs would be a reduction of \$77.8 million. Hydro
18 has not filed an amendment to the Amended Application to reflect these updates. The
19 compliance filing following the Amended Application should reflect the most recent fuel prices.

20 **Reference:** *Hydro Letter to the Board dated October 28, 2015, page 2, Table 1.*

21

22 Several additional, non-fuel, test year cost adjustments are also required based on the evidence
23 before the Board. Due to conflicting evidence before the Board, the required adjustments may

1 lack the element of precision in some cases. Nevertheless, the overall impact on Hydro's 2015
2 revenue requirement is substantial. The total required adjustments to Hydro's 2015 test year
3 non-fuel costs are in the range of \$26.3 million to \$31.1 million.

4
5 Required adjustments to Hydro's 2015 test year non-fuel costs include reductions to Hydro's
6 proposed rate base, production costs, operating costs and other costs.

7
8 The most significant rate base adjustments relate to the timing of Hydro's capital additions. For
9 2015, Hydro's opening rate base balance should be reduced to reflect those assets included in
10 Hydro's forecast rate base which were not in service on January 1, 2015. Other adjustments
11 should be made to remove those capital expenditures assessed to be imprudent by the Board in
12 the Prudence Review.

13
14 Hydro's 2015 test year production costs should be lower because the evidence does not support
15 the proposed Holyrood fuel conversion factor. Operating cost adjustments are required in the
16 areas of Human Resources, Intercompany Charges and Professional Services. Disallowances for
17 operating costs assessed to be imprudent by the Board in the Prudence Review will also be
18 necessary.

19
20 Other 2015 revenue requirement adjustments relate to Hydro's proposals for recovery of (i) the
21 debt guarantee fee, (ii) the fuel supply cost deferral from 2014, and (iii) Hydro's asset retirement
22 obligations. Finally, the evidence before the Board supports the imposition of a productivity
23 allowance as an incentive for operating efficiency.

1 **C.2 Costs Unsupported by Evidence in the 2015 Test Year**

2 **C.2.1 Unsupported Rate Base Items**

3 Hydro seeks approval for a forecast average rate base for 2015 of \$1,802.0 million. This
4 represents an increase of \$312.7 million over the 2007 approved rate base. Hydro seeks a 2015
5 return on average rate base of \$122.8 million at a rate of return on rate base of 6.82%.

6 **Reference:** *Evidence, Section 3.4.1, page 3.20, Table 3.9; Section 3.3.6, page 3.17,*
7 *Table 3.7.*

8
9 Hydro has overstated its 2015 average rate base. The evidence does not support Hydro's
10 proposals for inclusion of certain planned additions to plant in service and forecast capital
11 expenditures for projects Liberty has determined were imprudent. Furthermore, the evidence
12 shows that Hydro's allowances for fuel inventory and deferred charges as well as interest
13 capitalized during construction have been overstated. Hydro's proposed 2015 average rate base
14 should be reduced accordingly.

15
16 The rate base adjustments will have corresponding effects on the return on rate base and
17 amortization. In this section, Hydro's estimates of return on rate base and amortization impacts
18 have been used when available. Otherwise, return on rate base impacts are estimated on the
19 basis of the proposed rate of return on rate base of 6.82%. Amortization impacts are estimated
20 on the basis of Hydro's average depreciation rate of 3.5%. These impacts should be confirmed
21 by Hydro in its compliance filing.

22 **Reference:** *TIR-NP-NLH-011, footnote 3.*

1 *C.2.1.1 Overstated Plant in Service*

2 *Holyrood Combustion Turbine*

3 Construction on the new 100 MW Holyrood combustion turbine (“Holyrood CT”) began
4 following the award of a contract to ProEnergy in May 2014. The contract included an in-
5 service target of December 31, 2014. Hydro acknowledged that this was a “stretch target.” The
6 Holyrood CT was not in service until sometime between the third week of January and the end of
7 February 2015.

8 **Reference:** *Transcript, November 4, 2015, page 13, line 21 to page 14, line 21;*
9 *PR-DD-NLH-005.*

10

11 Hydro proposed an adjustment to its rate base for the purposes of calculating a 2015 Net Income
12 Deficiency in the 2015 Cost Recovery Deferral Application. This adjustment was in
13 acknowledgement of the fact that the Holyrood CT and other forecast additions to plant were not
14 in service at the beginning of 2015. No such adjustment is proposed for rate-making purposes.
15 Instead, Hydro proposes that the Holyrood CT remain in rate base for rate making purposes as it
16 will be “used and useful” during the period in which new rates are in effect.

17 **Reference:** *Amended 2015 Cost Deferral Application, November 12, 2015, Evidence, page 5;*
18 *Transcript, November 19, page 67, line 19 to page 68, line 17.*

19

20 Hydro acknowledges this is a departure from generally accepted regulatory practice. Hydro
21 claims this is necessary so that it does not earn a return on rate base in 2016 which would be
22 below the low end of the allowed range. Hydro has not presented any expert evidence in support
23 of its proposal.

24 **Reference:** *Transcript, November 19, 2015, pages 62-72.*

1 *Submission*

2 A reduction in the opening balance of Hydro's 2015 rate base is required in the circumstances.

3 Hydro estimates that such a reduction would be between \$110 million and \$112.7 million.

4 **Reference:** *TIR-NP-NLH-011; TIR-NP-NLH-003.*

5

6 Table C-1 shows the required reduction to the 2015 test year average rate base and revenue

7 requirement related to the removal of the Holyrood CT.

8

Table C-1
2015 Test Year
Holyrood CT
(\$000s)

	Rate Base		Return on Rate Base
	Year End	Average	
Holyrood CT	110,000	55,000	3,746

Reference: *TIR-NP-NLH-011.*

9

10 *Incomplete/Under Spent Capital Projects*

11 Hydro's capital expenditures have consistently been under budget. The average annual variance
12 between 2009 and 2013 was 15% below budget.

13 **Reference:** *Grant Thornton Report, June 12, 2015, page 110, lines 8-17 and Table 85.*

14

15 In 2014, Hydro's actual additions to assets in service were under budget by \$148.0 million. The
16 largest contributor to this variance was the Holyrood CT. Other incomplete projects totaling
17 \$38.0 million were carried forward to 2015.

1 These additions are included in the 2015 rate base at full value. A reduction in the opening
2 balance of Hydro's 2015 rate base is required to reflect the fact that the related assets were not in
3 service as of December 31, 2014.

4 **Reference:** *TIR-NP-NLH-011.*

5
6 Apart from 2014 carryovers, Hydro's 2015 forecast rate base included an addition of
7 approximately \$84.1 million to plant in service. Hydro submits that these additions, and all
8 carryovers from 2014, will be in service by 2015. Hydro claims this would bring its cumulative
9 additions in at less than 1% under budget for the 2014 and the 2015 years. This would not be
10 consistent with Hydro's recent experience.

11 **Reference:** *Undertaking 158, page 3.*

12
13 The evidence has not established that Hydro's historical trend of overestimating capital
14 expenditures by 15% annually will not be repeated in 2015. Because Hydro's proposal to
15 include the entire forecast plant additions in rate base for rate making purposes is not consistent
16 with recent experience, it would be an unwarranted burden on ratepayers.

17
18 *Submission*

19 A 15% reduction in the 2015 forecast plant in service would more accurately reflect Hydro's
20 historical completion of capital work. This would reduce the 2015 average rate base by \$6.3
21 million.

1 Table C-2 shows the reduction to 2015 test year average rate base and revenue requirement
2 related to incomplete/under spent capital projects.

3

Table C-2
2015 Test Year
Incomplete/Underspent Capital Projects
(\$000s)

	Rate Base		Revenue Requirement		
	Year End	Average	Return on Rate Base	Amortization	Total
2014 Actual	37,971	18,985	1,296	664	1,960
2015 Reduction ¹	12,615	6,308	430	221	651
Total	50,586	25,293	1,726	885	2,611

Reference: TIR-NP-NLH-011; Undertaking 158.

4

5 C.2.1.2 Capital Expenditure Disallowances for Imprudence

6 In its July 6, 2015 report, Liberty determined that Hydro's actions and management decisions
7 were imprudent in relation to 7 of the 11 projects the Board had asked Liberty to review for
8 prudence. Liberty recommended cost disallowances for 6 of these projects, subject to a
9 compliance review by the Board's financial experts. For the reasons stated in its written
10 submissions on the Prudence Review, Newfoundland Power agrees with some of Liberty's
11 findings. Hydro's customers should not be burdened with costs which would not have arisen but
12 for the imprudent decisions or actions of Hydro.

13 **Reference:** *Liberty Report, July 6, 2015, page ES-2.*

¹ Year-end rate base: \$84,100,000 x 15% = \$12,615,000. Average rate base: \$12,615,000 x 50% = \$6,307,500.
Return on rate base: \$6,307,500 x 6.82% = \$430,172. Amortization: \$6,307,500 x 3.5% = \$220,763.

1 *Submission*

2 Hydro's 2015 test year revenue requirement should be adjusted to reflect the cost implications of

3 its imprudent decision and actions.

4

5 Table C-3 shows the reduction to 2015 test year average rate base and revenue requirement

6 related to the disposition of the Prudence Review advocated by Newfoundland Power.²

7

Table C-3
2015 Test Year
Capital Cost Disallowances
(\$000s)

Project	Average Rate Base	Return on Rate Base
Western Avalon Tap Changer	1,429	97
Sunnyside Transformer	3,855	263
Holyrood/Sunnyside Breakers ³	1,002	68
January 2013 Holyrood Repair	3,970	271
Total	10,256	699

Reference: TIR-NP-NLH-003.

² In its written submissions on the Prudence Review, Newfoundland Power advocates a total of \$10 million in capital cost disallowances related to these items.

³ The average rate base amount of \$1,078,000 shown in TIR-NP-NLH-003 for the Holyrood and Sunnyside Breakers includes the Holyrood Unit 3 fan, which was found to be a prudent capital project by Liberty. The 2014 capital expenditure for this project was reported by Liberty to be \$76,407 (see page 23 of the July 6, 2015 Liberty Report). The estimated average rate base related to the Holyrood and Sunnyside Breakers is \$1,001,593 (\$1,078,000 – \$76,407). The return on rate base impact is estimated to be \$68,309 (\$1,001,593 x 6.82%).

1 C.2.1.3 Rate Base Allowances

2 Fuel Inventory

3 Hydro's average rate base for 2015 includes a forecast allowance for fuel inventory of \$66.6
4 million. This figure includes No.6 fuel costs of \$58.9 million, diesel fuel costs of \$3.5 million
5 and combustion turbine fuel costs of \$4.2 million.

6

7 This forecast is 30.8% higher than the \$50.9 million forecast included in the Original
8 Application.

9 **Reference:** Evidence, Original Rate Application, Section 3, Schedule III, page 2, line 12;
10 Evidence, Amended Application, Section 3, Schedule III, page 2, line 12; Grant
11 Thornton Report, June 12, 2015, page 27, Table 12; and Amended Application,
12 Exhibit 13, Schedule 1.1, page 2, lines 3 to 5.
13

14 Fuel prices in 2015 are significantly lower than Hydro's test year forecast. For example,
15 Hydro's forecast monthly inventory costs for No. 6 fuel for 2015 ranged from \$27 million to \$53
16 million, an average of approximately \$40 million. Those monthly forecasts are based on the
17 \$65.63/bbl fuel price used in Hydro's 2015 Interim Rates Application. The average is
18 approximately \$19 million lower than the 2015 test year forecast. The evidence does not
19 substantiate a fuel inventory allowance for No. 6 fuel above \$40 million. Hydro's 2015 average
20 rate base should be reduced by at least \$19 million on account of the No. 6 fuel price.

21 **Reference:** Amended Application, Exhibit 13, Schedule 1.1, page 2, line 3; IC-NLH-199.

1 Table C-4 shows the reduction to 2015 test year average rate base and revenue requirement
 2 related to fuel inventory.

3

Table C-4
2015 Test Year
Fuel Inventory
(\$000s)

	Average Rate Base	Return on Rate Base
Fuel Inventory	19,000	1,296
Total	19,000	1,296

*Reference: Amended Application, Exhibit 13, Schedule
 1.1, page 2, line 3; IC-NLH-199.*

4

5 Hydro has not filed updated fuel inventory costs for diesel and combustion turbine fuels.

6 Newfoundland Power submits that Hydro should include updated fuel inventory costs for all fuel
 7 types in its compliance filing.

8

9 *Deferred Charges*

10 Hydro's average rate base for 2015 includes a forecast allowance for deferred charges of \$77.5
 11 million. This amount is \$12.9 million higher than 2013 actuals, and \$6.3 million higher than the
 12 2014 forecast.

13 *Reference: Grant Thornton Report, June 12, 2015, page 27, Table 12.*

14

15 The 2015 test year includes certain charges approved for deferral subject to the Prudence

16 Review. Amongst other costs, these included (i) extraordinary repairs relating to air blast circuit

1 breakers and transformers; and (ii) additional capacity-related supply costs incurred by Hydro in
2 January of 2014.

3 **Reference:** *Grant Thornton Report, June 12, 2015, page 116, Table 88.*

4
5 Newfoundland Power has advocated that the recovery of the cost associated with the first item
6 should be disallowed. As for the second item, Liberty proposes disallowance of \$1.7 million and
7 Hydro proposes a disallowance of \$0 or \$1 million. As these disallowances do not include the
8 return on rate base impacts associated with the unamortized portion of these amounts, they are
9 understated.

10 **Reference:** *Newfoundland Power Written Submission - Prudence Review, page 14.*

11
12 Reductions in the closing rate base balances for 2014 and 2015 are required to reflect the
13 overstated deferred charges associated with capital and deferred cost consequences arising from
14 Hydro's imprudence.

1 *Submission*

2 Table C-5 shows the required reductions in the 2015 average rate base for the deferred charges
3 related to the disposition of the Prudence Review advocated by Newfoundland Power.

4

Table C-5
2015 Test Year Average Rate Base
Deferred Charges
(\$000s)

	2014 Year End Balance	2015 Year End Balance	Average
Supply Cost Deferral	1,000 – 1,700	1,000 – 1,700	1,000 – 1,700
Extraordinary Repairs	-	996	498
Total	1,000 – 1,700	1,996 – 2,696	1,498 – 2,198

References: *Grant Thornton Report, June 4, 2015, page 116, Table 88; Liberty Report, page ES-3.*

5

6 Table C-6 shows a summary of the required reduction in 2015 test year average rate base and
7 revenue requirement for overstated rate base allowances.

8

Table C-6
2015 Test Year Average Rate Base
Rate Base Allowances
(\$000s)

	Average Rate Base	Return on Rate Base
Fuel Inventory (<i>Table C-4</i>)	19,000	1,296
Deferred Charges (<i>Table C-5</i>)	1,498 – 2,198	102 - 150
Total	20,498 – 21,198	1,398 – 1,446

1 *C.2.1.4 Interest Capitalized During Construction*

2 Order-in-Council 2014-033 directed Hydro to commence construction of a 230 kV transmission
3 system, in Western Labrador, to provide service to the proposed Kami mine. The project was
4 suspended indefinitely in September of 2014, with no anticipated completion date. Hydro has
5 identified \$8.1 million in interest capitalized during construction (“IDC”) for 2015.

6 **Reference:** *CA-NLH-326, page 1, lines 8-10; PUB-NLH-309, Attachment 3, page 2.*

7

8 The Board’s financial experts have indicated that the IDC associated with the proposed Western
9 Labrador transmission system was included in “work in progress” for 2015. If that is the case,
10 there should be no effect on revenue requirement as a result of the suspension of the project.

11 Hydro identified this amount as having been included in rate base for 2015. If Hydro’s statement
12 is accurate, this amount should be removed from rate base and Hydro’s 2015 test year revenue
13 requirement reduced accordingly.

14 **Reference:** *Grant Thornton Report, June 12, 2015, page 114, lines 27-28; PUB-NLH-309,*
15 *Attachment 3, page 2; NP-PUB-012.*

- 1 *Submission*
- 2 Table C-7 shows the required reductions to the 2015 average rate base and revenue requirement
- 3 associated with the removal of IDC for the 230 kV transmission system in Western Labrador.
- 4

Table C-7
2015 Test Year
Interest Capitalized During Construction
(\$000s)

	Rate Base		Return on Rate Base
	Year End	Average	
Interest Capitalized During Construction	8,108	4,054	276
Total	8,108	4,054	276

Reference: PUB-NLH-309, Attachment 3, page 2.

- 1 C.2.1.5 Summary of Unsupported Rate Base Items
- 2 Table C-8 summarizes the required reductions in average rate base and associated revenue
- 3 requirement impacts for the 2015 test year.
- 4

Table C-8
2015 Test Year Average Rate Base
Summary of Adjustments
(\$000s)

	Average Rate Base	Revenue Requirement		
		Return on Rate Base	Amortization	Total
Holyrood CT (Table C-1)	55,000	3,746	-	3,746
Incomplete/Underspent Projects (Table C-2)	25,293	1,726	885	2,611
Prudence Disallowances (Table C-3)	10,256	699	-	699
Rate Base Allowances (Table C-6)	20,498 – 21,198	1,398 – 1,446	-	1,398 – 1,446
Interest Capitalized During Construction (Table C-7)	4,054	276	-	276
Total	115,101 – 115,801	7,845 – 7,893	885	8,730 – 8,778

1 **C.2.2** *Unsupported Production Costs*

2 **C.2.2.1** *Holyrood Conversion Factor*

3 Hydro's existing rates are predicated on a conversion factor of 630 kWh/bbl. This was set by the
4 Board after considerable review in Order No. P.U.14 (2004). Hydro proposed the same
5 conversion factor in its 2006/2007 general rate application. In the Amended Application, Hydro
6 proposes to set rates on the basis of a conversion factor of 607 kwh/bbl. The revenue
7 requirement impact of the proposed change to the Holyrood conversion factor is in the order of
8 \$7.0 million.

9 **Reference:** *Evidence, Section 3.8.2, page 3.50, lines 7-13; TIR-NP-NLH-007.*

10

11 Hydro cites (i) lower production requirements; (ii) lower fuel heating content due to a switch to
12 fuel with a 0.7% sulfur content; and (iii) lower unit net average loading, as contributors to recent
13 experiences with lower conversion factors. The evidence does not support Hydro's suggestion
14 that higher conversion factors will not be obtainable in the future.

15 **Reference:** *Evidence, Section 2.1, page 2.4, lines 1-4; NP-NLH-379; NP-NLH-377.*

16

17 With respect to production requirements, the evidence suggests that Holyrood production will
18 increase significantly in the test period and the fuel conversion factor generally increases in line
19 with production.

20 **Reference:** *NP-NLH-377.*

1 Regarding heating content, Hydro concedes there is no direct evidence that the heating content of
2 fuel decreases with sulfur content. Hydro has recently switched fuel suppliers. There is no
3 evidence that Hydro will not be able to obtain No. 6 fuel with a higher heating content in future.

4 **Reference:** NP-NLH-377; Transcript, September 23, 2015, page 91, line 14 to page 92,
5 line 10.
6

7 Finally, on the impact of average gross loading per unit, Hydro has not commissioned any study
8 to investigate the impact of this, or any other factor, on Holyrood efficiency.

9 **Reference:** NP-NLH-194, Revision 1, page 2, lines 4-17 and page 3, footnote 1.
10

11 Hydro's regression analysis is evidence only of the conversion factor experienced historically.
12 The evidence of the impact on Holyrood efficiency of operational and maintenance issues in
13 2013 and 2014 is unclear. Hydro has not provided evidence that the conversion factor of 630
14 kWh/bbl currently used in rates will not be attainable at higher forecast loads or through
15 reasonable efficiency modifications in the future.

16 **Reference:** Evidence, Section 2, Schedule V.
17

18 Modifying the Holyrood Conversion factor from 630 kWh/bbl to 607 kWh/bbl has a significant
19 effect on No.6 fuel production costs. This effect is increased when changes in fuel prices are
20 factored in. Based on an average cost per barrel of \$93.32/bbl, No.6 fuel production costs
21 included in the Amended Application are \$244.9 million. Using the updated average fuel price
22 of \$64.41/bbl, No. 6 fuel production costs were \$75.9 million lower.

23 **Reference:** Hydro Letter to the Board dated October 28, 2015, page 2, Table 1.

1 The No. 6 fuel production costs in the Third Interim Rate Application reflected an average No. 6
2 fuel price of \$65.63/bbl. At that price, No. 6 fuel production costs would be approximately \$7.1
3 million dollars lower if the Holyrood conversion factor remained at 630 kWh/bbl. Based on the
4 updated fuel price of \$64.41/bbl. and a Holyrood conversion factor of 630 kWh/bbl., the 2015
5 test year No. 6 fuel production costs should be approximately \$7.0 million lower.

6 **Reference:** *Evidence, Section 2.6.1, page 2.76; Evidence, Section 3, Schedule II, page 1,*
7 *line 10; TIR-NP-NLH-007.*
8

9 The Island Industrial Customers' cost of service witnesses recommended a conversion rate of
10 622 kWh/bbl as an alternative to Hydro's proposed Holyrood conversion factor of 607 kWh/bbl.
11 This alternative was based on concerns that the station service factor of 6.61% which was used in
12 Hydro's calculations did not take into account growing customer loads. A more representative
13 station service factor of 5.85% was recommended. The lower station service factor results in an
14 improvement in the overall conversion factor by 7kWh/bbl. They also opined that Hydro had not
15 sufficiently accounted for efficiencies due to the installation of variable frequency drives on the
16 Holyrood units. The variable frequency drives are expected to improve Holyrood efficiency by
17 an additional 8 kWh/bbl.

18 **Reference:** *NP-NLH-189 (Revision 1) page 2; Updated Pre-filed Testimony of P. Bowman*
19 *and H. Najmidinov, June 4, 2015, page 26, Figure 4-2 and lines 3-5; and page*
20 *27, lines 3-13.*
21

22 *Submission*

23 In Newfoundland Power's submission, no credible evidence has been brought forward to
24 indicate that the 630 kWh/bbl conversion factor for Holyrood presently utilized for ratemaking
25 purposes is unreasonable. Therefore, no reasonable basis exists to change the conversion factor
26 in this proceeding.

1 In the alternative, if the Board is satisfied that an adjustment to the Holyrood conversion factor is
2 warranted, the Holyrood Conversion Factor of 622 kWh/bbl recommended by the Industrial
3 Customers' cost of service witnesses could be used for ratemaking purposes. The resulting
4 impact of this alternative on revenue requirement is not readily discernible from the record. It
5 would have to be provided in a compliance filing.

6

7 C.2.2.2 Gas Turbine Fuel

8 In 2015, Hydro's combustion turbine fuel expense decreased due to lower fuel prices. There is
9 evidence that the overall impact on revenue requirement related to this decrease would be in the
10 order of \$0.6 million. Hydro proposes to include the revenue impacts of this decrease in a cost
11 of service study to be included in its compliance filing.

12 **Reference:** TIR-NP-NLH-008; TIR-NP-NLH-010.

13

14 C.2.2.3 Summary of Unsupported Production Costs

15 Table C-9 summarizes the required reductions in revenue requirement for the 2015 test year
16 related to production costs.

17

Table C-9
2015 Test Year Revenue Requirement
Summary of Production Costs Adjustments
(\$000s)

	Fuel
Holyrood Conversion Factor	7,116
Gas Turbine Fuel	580
Total	7,696

References: TIR-NP-NLH-007; TIR-NP-NLH-010.

1 **C.2.3** *Unsupported Operating Costs*

2 **C.2.3.1** *Operating Cost Prudence Disallowances*

3 Liberty recommends disallowances for operating costs from the 2015 test year related to
4 imprudent actions of Hydro. The forecast 2015 operating costs which Liberty determined could
5 have been avoided, but for imprudent actions of Hydro, were initially estimated at \$2.6 million.
6 Liberty subsequently acknowledged that depreciation costs included in the \$2.6 million should
7 be reduced by \$0.2 million.

8 **Reference:** *Liberty Report, July 6, 2015, page ES-2; Reply of Liberty, September 17, 2015,*
9 *page 17, lines 1-15.*

10

11 For the reasons stated in its written submission on the Prudence Review, Newfoundland Power
12 agrees with some, but not all, of Liberty’s recommendations regarding 2015 operating cost
13 disallowances related to Hydro’s imprudence. In summary, the effect of Newfoundland Power’s
14 written submission in the Prudence Review is that a total of \$1,174,000 should be disallowed
15 from Hydro’s 2015 test year. This is composed of \$800,000 of depreciation associated with
16 Holyrood Unit 1, \$174,000 associated with operating cost consequences related to Hydro
17 maintenance deficiencies, and \$200,000 representing the test year amortization of the 2015
18 extraordinary transformer and breaker repairs.

19 **Reference:** *Newfoundland Power’s Written Submission – Prudence Review, Tables 4, 6*
20 *and 8.*

21

22 *Submission*

23 Hydro’s revenue requirement for the 2015 test year should be reduced by \$1,174,000 to reflect
24 the 2015 operating cost consequences of the Board’s Prudence Review.

1 C.2.3.2 *Overstated Human Resources Costs*

2 Since 2007, Hydro's actual salary costs have increased by 43.3% on an inflation adjusted basis.

3 The salary and benefit costs included in the 2015 test year are \$88.9 million.

4

5 Hydro claims they strive to maintain operating costs within inflationary levels. Salary costs are
6 exempt from that level of control. Hydro cites a "tightening labour market" and an increase in its
7 capital program as reasons for the increase in salary and benefits.

8 **Reference:** *Grant Thornton Report, June 12, 2015, page 64, Table 40; NP-NLH-314;*
9 *Undertaking 4, Revision 1, page 5, 2013 Budget O&M Guidance; Evidence,*
10 *Section 1.4.1.1, page 1.21, lines 3-6.*

11

12 Hydro prepares annual workforce budgets based on full-time-equivalent positions ("FTEs"). In
13 2015, Hydro has budgeted for a significant increase over previous years' experience. Between
14 2007 and 2013 Hydro maintained its net FTEs between 797 and 813. In 2014 and 2015, Hydro
15 forecasts an increase in net FTEs to 860 and 888, respectively.

16 **Reference:** *Evidence, Section 3.7.3, page 3.40, Chart 3.5.*

17

18 Hydro acknowledges that vacancies can occur from time to time and that an allowance or
19 adjustment to workforce budgets should be made in computing test year costs. It is Hydro's
20 practice to include a vacancy adjustment in test year costs to reflect forecast vacancies. For the
21 2015 Test Year, Hydro has made an adjustment of \$3.3 million, reflective of 40 FTE vacancies,
22 at \$83,000 per FTE.

23 **Reference:** *CA-NLH-104, Revision 1, page 4, lines 14-16; IC-NLH-005, Revision 1.*

1 Hydro's recent vacancies have been much higher than is accounted for in the 2015 test year. In
2 2012, 2013 and 2014, Hydro experienced 52, 51 and 52 vacancies, respectively. As of
3 September 2015, Hydro was forecasting 65 vacancies for 2015.

4 **Reference:** *NP-NLH-310 Transcript, September 16, page 182, line 14.*

5
6 Hydro has not proposed any adjustment to the 2015 test year to reflect the higher number of
7 vacancies. Hydro claims that it will maintain a workforce within the forecast 40 vacancies for
8 the test period.

9 **Reference:** *Transcript, September 16, 2015, page 180, line 21 to page 181, line 21.*

10

11 This is not consistent with past experience or the evidence. Further, Hydro's suggestion that
12 lower Human Resources costs due to higher vacancies would be offset by increased overtime and
13 consultant costs was not proven by evidence. For these reasons, the \$88.9 million in salaries and
14 fringe benefits sought to be recovered from ratepayers is unreasonable.

15 **Reference:** *Transcript, November 17, 2015, page 12, line 17 – page 16, line 12.*

16

17 *Submission*

18 The 2015 revenue requirement should be reduced by \$2.1 million to reflect the higher vacancies
19 actually expected in the 2015 test year.⁴

⁴ 65 forecast vacancies less 40 test year vacancies = 25 vacancies. 25 vacancies x \$83,000 = \$2,075,000.

1 C.2.3.3 *Intercompany Charges*

2 Among other services, Hydro renders common services to affiliates in the functional areas of
3 human resources, safety and health and information services (“IS”). These services are
4 performed by home-based Hydro employees. Affiliates are charged for those services on the
5 basis of a billing allocator. Costs for the first two functional areas are allocated using FTEs as an
6 allocator. IS related costs are recovered on the basis of average number of users.

7 **Reference:** *Evidence, Exhibit 8, Intercompany Transaction Costing Guidelines, page 3.*

8

9 The Board’s transfer pricing expert, Mr. Rolph, reviewed Hydro’s intercompany transaction
10 policies and found them to be more or less reasonable with some exceptions. Mr. Rolph did not
11 audit actual transactions for reasonableness; nor did he consider whether any specific
12 transactions within the matrix organization could affect the operational or managerial integrity of
13 Hydro as a regulated entity.

14 **Reference:** *Transcript, October 19, 2015, page 29, lines 4-16 and page 40, lines 1-21.*

15

16 In his June 1, 2015 report, Mr. Rolph raised the concern that the common services charges which
17 Hydro recovers from its affiliates may not be fully burdened. As such, they are understated.

18 Hydro has acknowledged this deficiency.

19 **Reference:** *Transcript, November 16, 2015, page 9, line 15 to page 10, line 19.*

20

21 According to Hydro, the resulting impact of the understatement on the 2015 test year is
22 \$114,000.

23 **Reference:** *Undertaking 151.*

1 In addition to the concern raised by Mr. Rolph, Newfoundland Power submits that the manner in
2 which Hydro's core shared services costs are allocated is not consistent with least cost principles.
3 All of the personnel providing core shared services for Nalcor's lines of business are Hydro
4 employees. Because these costs are allocated based on the total FTEs of the Nalcor group, more
5 of the costs of common services are allocated to regulated Hydro. If those costs were allocated
6 as if the employees were home based in the parent company, Nalcor, Hydro's 2015 revenue
7 requirement would be lower by approximately \$882,000. In Newfoundland Power's submission,
8 this would be a more equitable approach for rate payers.

9 **Reference:** *NP-NLH-204.*

10

11 *Submission*

12 The 2015 revenue requirement should be reduced by \$114,000 to correct the understatement of
13 the common services charges Hydro recovers from its affiliates. The 2015 revenue requirement
14 should be further reduced by \$882,000 to reflect a more equitable allocation of common services
15 costs.

1 Table C-10 summarizes the required reductions to revenue requirement for the 2015 test year
 2 related to intercompany charges.

3

Table C-10
2015 Test Year Revenue Requirement
Intercompany Charges
(\$000s)

	Operating
Fully burdened costs	114
Allocation method ⁵	882
Total	996

Reference: Undertaking 151; NP-NLH-204.

4

5 *C.2.3.4 GRA and Board Related Costs*

6 Under the heading of Professional Services, Hydro seeks to recover a total of \$8.4 million after
 7 cost recoveries from affiliates in the 2015 test year. This amount includes \$2.3 million in GRA
 8 and Board Related Costs.

9 *Reference: Evidence, Section 2.4.1, page 2.39, Table 2.7.*

10

11 From 2007 to 2014 inclusive, Hydro's annual GRA and Board Related Costs averaged \$1.5
 12 million. This average includes \$3.8 million from 2014, an outlier year in which Hydro filed the
 13 Amended Application, updated and responded to RFIs from both the Original and Amended
 14 Applications, and filed two interim rates applications.

15 *Reference: Grant Thornton Report, June 12, 2015, page 80, Tables 64 and 65.*

⁵ Allocation method: See NP-NLH-204, page 2 of 2. Scenario (i) of \$8,919,000 less Scenario (ii) of \$8,037,500 = \$881,500.

1 In 2012 and 2013, Hydro prepared and filed the Original Application, as well as a number of
 2 related applications. Its actual costs for those years were \$1.8 and \$1.2 million, respectively. In
 3 Newfoundland Power's submission, Hydro has not provided an evidentiary basis to establish that
 4 GRA and Board Related costs in excess of \$1.5 million annually are reasonable.

5
 6 *Submission*

7 Hydro's proposed 2015 test year GRA and Board related costs should be reduced from \$2.3
 8 million to \$1.5 million.

9
 10 *C.2.3.5 Summary of Unsupported Operating Costs*

11 Table C-11 summarizes the required reductions in Hydro's 2015 test year revenue requirement
 12 related to operating costs.

13

Table C-11
2015 Test Year Revenue Requirement
Summary of Operating Cost Adjustments
(\$000s)

	Operating
Prudence Disallowances (<i>page C-20</i>)	1,174
Overstated Human Resources Costs (<i>page C-22</i>)	2,075
Intercompany Charges (<i>Table C-10</i>)	996
GRA and Board Related Costs (<i>page C-26</i>)	800
Total	5,045

1 **C.2.4** *Unsupported Other Costs*

2 **C.2.4.1** *Debt Guarantee Fee*

3 Hydro pays an annual fee to the provincial government to guarantee its debt. Hydro has included
4 a forecast fee of \$4.4 million in the 2015 Test Year, citing a Provincial Government direction in
5 an Order-in-Council as the basis for both the requirement to pay and the amount to be paid.

6 **Reference:** *Evidence, Section 3.5.3, page 3.32, Table 3.13; NP-NLH-254.*

7

8 Historically, this fee was paid as directed by the Lieutenant Governor in Council pursuant to
9 section 32 of the *Hydro Corporation Act*, which stated as follows:

- 10 “32. (1) *The corporation shall pay annually to the Minister of Finance a fee in*
11 *respect of loans guaranteed by the Minister of Finance under this Act.*
12 (2) *The Lieutenant-Governor in Council may make regulations*
13 *(a) respecting the calculation of the fee referred to in subsection (1); and*
14 *(b) respecting the manner in which and the time at which the fee referred to*
15 *in subsection (1) shall be paid.”*
16

17 **Reference:** *RSNL 1990 Ch. H-16.*

18

19 Section 32 of the *Hydro Corporation Act* was repealed by section 36 of the *Regulatory Reform*
20 *Act*, SNL 1996 Ch. R-10.1. The *Hydro Corporation Act* was repealed in 2007 with the passing
21 of the *Hydro Corporation Act, 2007* SNL 2007 Ch. H-17.

22

23 The Order-in-Council is made under the authority of sections 21 to 25 of the *Hydro Corporation*
24 *Act, 2007*. These sections contain no provision directing Hydro to pay a debt guarantee fee to
25 the Minister of Finance, nor do they grant specific powers to the Lieutenant-Governor to make

1 regulations respecting the calculation of any fee. Sections 21 to 25 essentially mirror sections in
2 the repealed legislation. Neither refer to a debt guarantee fee.

3 **Reference:** SNL 2007 Ch. H-17; OC-2011-218.

4

5 Given the repeal of the legislative requirement to pay a debt guarantee fee the direction to Hydro
6 in OC-2011-218 was *ultra vires* and is therefore unenforceable. Hydro is not legally obliged to
7 pay the debt guarantee fee. On that basis, Hydro’s 2015 test year revenue requirement should be
8 reduced by \$4.4 million.

9

10 If the Board is satisfied that payment of a debt guarantee fee is in the interests of ratepayers, the
11 Board should consider whether the proposed fee is a reasonable one. In that regard, the Board
12 should be mindful that the fee is to be paid to a related party.

13

14 Order-in-Council 2011-218 directs Hydro to pay a fee on the outstanding balance of the debt
15 obligations of Hydro, net of related sinking funds from 2011 forward. The fee is equal to 25
16 basis points on all outstanding debt set to mature in 10 years, plus 50 basis points on longer term
17 debt.

18 **Reference:** PUB-NLH-058, Attachment 1.

19

20 The Board’s financial experts found the fee charged on both the short-term and the long-term
21 debt of Hydro does not reflect an equitable apportionment between Hydro and the Provincial
22 Government of the “cost savings” attributable to the debt guarantee. Grant Thornton

1 recommended that a more equitable apportionment be considered.

2 **Reference:** *Grant Thornton Report, June 12, 2014, page 20, lines 7-18.*

3

4 The Board's financial experts also raised concerns that the 50 bps charged by the province for
5 guaranteeing Hydro's long-term debt was high in comparison to the average differences in the
6 province's long term bond yields and yields of the proxy group of comparable utilities
7 considered by Hydro's expert.

8 **Reference:** *Grant Thornton Report, June 12, 2015, page 20, lines 13-15.*

9

10 The fee proposed by Hydro is not shown to be reasonable by the evidence. In the event the
11 Board determines that ratepayers derive a benefit from Hydro's payment of a debt guarantee fee,
12 Newfoundland Power proposes that the fee should reflect an equal sharing of the cost savings
13 between Hydro and the province and a more reasonable yield range. These issues are addressed
14 by the fee calculated in Undertaking 139. Calculating the debt guarantee fee in this manner
15 would result in a downward adjustment of \$2.6 million in the 2015 test year revenue
16 requirement.

17 **Reference:** *Undertaking 139.*

18

19 *Submission*

20 Newfoundland Power submits that the debt guarantee fee is unenforceable and should therefore
21 not be recovered from Hydro's customers. If the Board determines that the debt guarantee fee
22 benefits customers, the portion of the debt guarantee fee of \$4.4 million proposed to be
23 recovered from customers should be reduced by \$2.6 million.

1 Table C-12 shows the required range of adjustment to the 2015 test year revenue requirement
2 related to the debt guarantee fee.

3

Table C-12
2015 Test Year Revenue Requirement
Debt Guarantee Fee
(\$000s)

	Range
Debt Guarantee Fee	2,600 - 4,447

*References: Undertaking 139; PUB-NLH-060,
Revision 1, Attachment 1.*

4

5 *C.2.4.2 Fuel Supply Cost Deferral*

6 The 2015 test year as filed includes an amortization of a fuel supply cost deferral of
7 approximately \$2.0 million. This represents Hydro's proposal to recover approximately \$10.0
8 million in additional energy and fuel supply costs related to the January 2014 outages over a five
9 year period.⁶

10 **Reference:** *Evidence, Section 3, Schedule 1, page 6, line 11.*

11

12 In its written submissions on the Prudence Review, Newfoundland Power indicates a
13 disallowance of between \$1 million to \$1.7 million in deferred January 2014 supply related
14 costs.

15 **Reference:** *Newfoundland Power Written Submission – Prudence Review, pages 13-14.*

⁶ The fuel supply deferral proposed by Hydro is \$9,956,000. The annual amortization is \$1,991,000.

1 *Submission*

2 In accordance with Newfoundland Power's written submissions in the Prudence Review,
3 Hydro's 2015 test year revenue requirement should be reduced by between 1/5 of \$1 million
4 (or \$200,000) and 1/5 of \$1.7 million (or \$340,000) to reflect the disallowance of a portion of
5 deferred January 2014 supply related costs.⁷

6

7 *C.2.4.3 Asset Retirement Obligations*

8 In the Settlement Agreement, the parties agreed that Hydro's proposal to include depreciation
9 and accretion expenses associated with Asset Retirement Obligations in 2015 should be reduced
10 from \$3.2 million to \$2.6 million in the 2015 Test Year. This \$0.6 million reduction reflects the
11 exclusion of certain construction and selective decommissioning costs at the Holyrood thermal
12 generating station. These costs will be incurred to the benefit of customers subsequent to the
13 Labrador-Island Interconnection, and Hydro may apply for recovery of such costs in the future.

14 **Reference:** *Consent 1, page 2.*

15

16 *Submission*

17 Newfoundland Power submits that the Board should reduce Hydro's 2015 test year revenue
18 requirement by \$0.6 million to reflect the reduction related to Asset Retirement Obligations
19 agreed in the Settlement Agreement.

⁷ Because the proposed recovery of the deferred January 2014 supply related costs is over a 5 year term, the appropriate recognition of the reduced recovery for 2015 is 1/5 of the amount disallowed.

1 *C.2.4.4 Summary of Unsupported Other Costs*

2 Table C-13 summarizes the required reductions in the 2015 test year revenue requirement related
3 to other costs.

4

Table C-13
2015 Test Year Revenue Requirement
Summary of Other Cost Adjustments
(\$000s)

	Other
Debt Guarantee Fee (<i>Table C-12</i>)	2,600 – 4,447
Fuel Supply Cost Deferral (<i>page C-31</i>)	200 – 340
Asset Retirement Obligation (<i>page C-31</i>)	600
Total	3,400 – 5,387

5

6 *C.2.5 Productivity Allowance*

7 Hydro is obligated under the *Electrical Power Control Act, 1994* to manage and operate its
8 facilities in a manner that results in power being delivered to customers of the province at the
9 lowest possible cost consistent with reliable service. Hydro’s executive and management team
10 takes the position that Hydro has exercised reasonable control over its controllable costs. The
11 evidence offered in this proceeding is not consistent with that position.

12 **Reference:** *Electrical Power Control Act, 1994, SNL 1994, Ch. E-5.1, s. 3(b)(iii).*

13

14 Hydro’s President and Chief Executive Officer testified that efficiency is “a key factor in terms
15 of cost control.” Hydro has not provided evidence of performance measures that demonstrate the
16 efficiency of its operations. Hydro does not have specific programs directed towards efficiency
17 improvement. At the time of Hydro’s 2001 General Rate Application, the Board imposed a
18 productivity allowance on Hydro’s controllable costs.

1 **Reference:** Transcript, September 10, 2015, page 62, lines 12-14; Order No. P.U. 7 (2002-
2 2003), page 73.

3
4 *Submission*

5 Newfoundland Power submits that the evidence before the Board justifies imposition of a
6 productivity allowance similar to the one the Board imposed on Hydro in Order No. P.U. 7
7 (2002-2003).

8
9 Table C-14 shows a range of adjustments from 1% to 3% of Hydro's 2015 test year operating
10 costs.

Table C-14
2015 Test Year Revenue Requirement
Productivity Allowance
(\$000s)

	@ 1%	@ 2%	@ 3%
2015 Operating Costs	138,179	138,179	138,179
Productivity Allowance	1%	2%	3%
Total	1,382	2,764	4,145

Reference: Evidence, Section 3, Schedule 1, page 1, line 7.

- 1 **C.2.6 Summary of Costs Unsupported by Evidence in the 2015 Test Year**
- 2 The total reductions to revenue requirement are summarized in Table C-15 below.

Table C-15
2015 Test Year Revenue Requirement
Summary of Adjustments
(\$000s)

Rate Base Items (Table C-8)		
Holyrood CT	3,746	
Incomplete/Underspent Projects	2,611	
Prudence Disallowances	699	
Rate Base Allowances	1,398 – 1,446	
Interest Capitalized During Construction	276	
		8,730 – 8,778
Production Costs (Table C-9)		
Holyrood Conversion Factor	7,116	
Combustion Turbine Fuel	580	
		7,696
Operating Costs (Table C-11)		
Prudence Disallowances	1,174	
Overstated Human Resources Costs	2,075	
Intercompany Charges	996	
GRA and Board Related Costs	800	
		5,045
Other Costs (Table C-13)		
Debt Guarantee Fee	2,600 – 4,447	
Fuel Supply Cost Deferral	200 – 340	
Asset Retirement Obligation	600	
		3,400 – 5,387
Productivity (Table C-14)		1,382 – 4,145
Total		26,253 – 31,051

1 **D. 2014 REVENUE DEFICIENCY**

2 **D.1 General**

3 The Amended Rate Application presents a 2014 test year revenue requirement, not for the
4 purpose of establishing rates, but to provide for recovery from Hydro's customers of a material
5 revenue deficiency for 2014. The amount of the 2014 Revenue Deficiency for which Hydro
6 seeks recovery in the Amended Application is \$45.9 million.

7 **Reference:** *Evidence, Section 1.1.3, page 1.4, lines 1-11; Evidence, Section 3.1, page 3.10,*
8 *lines 1-4.*

9
10 Hydro proposes to recover this amount by applying an accumulated credit balance in the RSP to
11 offset the 2014 Revenue Deficiency, with any remainder to be recovered by means of a rate rider
12 on future customer rates.

13 **Reference:** *Transcript, November 19, 2015, page 40, line 2 to page 41, line 6.*

14
15 **Background**

16 On November 28, 2014, Hydro filed an application seeking deferral and recovery of the 2014
17 Revenue Deficiency of \$45.9 million so that Hydro would have the opportunity to earn a
18 reasonable return for 2014. The application was one of a series of applications made by Hydro
19 seeking interim relief in respect of the Original Application. Two earlier requests for interim
20 relief on the Original Application were considered by the Board, and denied.

21 **Reference:** *Order Nos. P.U. 13 and 39 (2014).*

1 In Order No. P.U. 58 (2014), the Board, amongst other things, approved Hydro's segregation of
2 \$45.9 million in a deferral account but did not approve the recovery of this amount, either in part
3 or in full.

4 **Reference:** *Order No. P.U. 58 (2014), page 9, lines 17-20.*

5
6 In approving the creation of Hydro's proposed 2014 Cost Deferral Account, the Board stated that
7 the approval of the account and the segregation of \$45.9 million in the account in 2014 would be
8 subject to the Board's subsequent determination, following a full review, as to whether it is
9 appropriate to grant any recovery to Hydro.

10 **Reference:** *Order No. P.U. 58 (2014), page 9, lines 1-20.*

11
12 Following the Board's issuance of Order No. P.U. 58 (2014), Hydro determined it was
13 reasonable to record the \$45.9 million as a regulatory asset in 2014. Any Board determination in
14 a 2016 final order on the Amended Application that part, or all, of the \$45.9 million 2014
15 Revenue Deficiency should not be recovered from customers will be recognized by Hydro for
16 financial reporting purposes in 2016.

17 **Reference:** *Transcript, November 19, 2015, page 78, line 20 to page 79, line 10; Transcript,*
18 *November 19, 2015, page 42, line 25 to page 45, line 2.*

20 **D.2 2014 Test Year Costs**

21 Hydro's proposed recovery of the 2014 Revenue Deficiency is based on full recovery of Hydro's
22 2014 test year costs. This includes costs associated with projects not yet approved by the Board
23 for inclusion in rate base, costs that have not been shown by evidence to be reasonable, and costs
24 that are subject to the Prudence Review. The 2014 Revenue Deficiency also assumes a 2014

1 target return on equity for Hydro of 8.8% based on an Order-in-Council that is not clearly
2 applicable to 2014, since 2014 is not a year in which new rates are being set by the Board.

3
4 Newfoundland Power’s submissions on a reasonable return for Hydro for 2014 are found in the
5 following Section D.3. Submissions on regulatory practice considerations raised by Hydro’s
6 proposal to recover the 2014 Revenue Deficiency are found in Section D.4. Detailed
7 submissions on Hydro’s proposed 2014 test year costs are found in Section D.5.

8

9 **D.3 Entitlement to a Reasonable Return for 2014**

10 Hydro has stated that recovery of the 2014 Revenue Deficiency will provide it with an
11 opportunity to earn a reasonable return on rate base for 2014. Calculation of the 2014 Revenue
12 Deficiency of \$45.9 million reflects a return on equity of 8.8%.

13 **Reference:** *Evidence, Section 1.1.3, page 1.4; Transcript, November 16, 2015, page 163, line*
14 *23 to page 165, line 2.*

15

16 By Order-in-Council, the Board has been directed to “set the same target rate of return on equity
17 as was most recently set for Newfoundland Power through a General Rate Application or
18 calculated through the Newfoundland Power Automatic Adjustment Mechanism.” The Order-in-
19 Council is to take effect “commencing with the first General Rate Application by Newfoundland
20 and Labrador Hydro after January 1, 2009.” In considering Hydro’s proposed recovery of the
21 2014 Revenue Deficiency, the Board must determine whether the Order-in-Council applies to
22 Hydro’s 2014 Test Year.

23 **Reference:** *OC2009-063.*

1 In regulatory practice, a general rate application typically involves consideration of a utility's
2 proposal for new rates, tolls and charges. In this jurisdiction, rates are designed to recover the
3 utility's revenue requirement based on a forecast test year. In the Amended Application, Hydro
4 proposes that the Board approve new rates based on a 2015 test year. A test year forecast of
5 2014 costs was also filed with the Amended Application. The 2014 test year is not proposed as a
6 basis for setting customer rates. Rather, it is presented as a basis for recovery of Hydro's 2014
7 Revenue Deficiency. Hydro acknowledges that this is a departure from normal regulatory
8 practice.

9 **Reference:** *Transcript, November 19, 2015, page 33, line 11 to page 34, line 6.*

10

11 The Order-in-Council does not specifically provide that a target rate of return on equity for
12 Hydro based on the Newfoundland Power rate is intended to take effect prior to the year for
13 which new rates are proposed. Further, it is not clear how establishing a new 2014 target rate of
14 return on equity for Hydro in 2015 is consistent with the prospective nature of ratemaking in this
15 jurisdiction. Accordingly, it is not clear that establishing a 2014 rate of return on rate base for
16 Hydro based on Newfoundland Power's 8.8% target return on equity is required by the Order-in-
17 Council.

1 The entitlement to earn a just and reasonable return is found in Section 80 of the *Public Utilities*
2 *Act*. It has been considered by the Board on numerous occasions. In Order No. P.U. 39 (2014),
3 the Board observed as follows:

4 *“The Board agrees that Hydro is entitled to earn annually a just and reasonable*
5 *return on its rate base, as provided for in section 80 of the Act, but notes that*
6 *Hydro is not guaranteed to earn the established return. The rate of return is,*
7 *where practicable, established by the Board on a prospective basis and Hydro*
8 *must manage its business, working within the existing regulatory framework, so*
9 *as to minimize the risks and maximize its opportunity for a just and reasonable*
10 *return. The Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal addressed this issue in*
11 *Newfoundland (Board of Commissioners of Public Utilities), Re (1998), 164 Nfld*
12 *and P.E.I. R.60, stating at paragraph 31:*

13
14 *[31] This leads to another point. Because the setting of the rate of return is*
15 *based on projections one cannot be sure that the rate of return will be*
16 *achieved in practice. Although the utility is "entitled" by s. 80 of the Act to*
17 *have the Board determine a just and reasonable rate of return based on*
18 *appropriate predictive techniques and methodologies, it is not "entitled", in*
19 *the sense of being guaranteed, to that rate of return. The utility therefore*
20 *takes the risk that its chosen management techniques and the future economic*
21 *climate may not yield its expected success. Although some of the activities of*
22 *the utility are regulated within the framework of the statutory objectives, the*
23 *utility nevertheless remains subject to business risks and effects of*
24 *management decisions. To that extent, the financial risks associated with the*
25 *operation of the utility, just as in the case of any private business, are to be*
26 *born by the investors in the enterprise, not the customer of the service.*

27
28 *As indicated by the Court of Appeal in paragraph 32 “...the powers of the Board*
29 *must be regulative and corrective, but not managerial, and they do not therefore*
30 *contemplate a retroactive adjustment of the actions of management.”*

31
32 **Reference:** Order No. P.U. 39 (2014), page 9, line 24 to page 10, line 3.

33 34 **D.4 Regulatory Practice Considerations**

35 Hydro’s evidence indicates that “[a] revenue deficiency occurs when existing rates are not
36 adequate to recover prudently incurred costs of operating a utility.”

37 **Reference:** Evidence, Section 3.2, page 3.6, lines 12 - 13.

1 In Order No. P.U. 58 (2014), the Board noted concerns expressed by Newfoundland Power, Vale
2 and the Industrial Customer Group “in relation to whether Hydro’s proposals with regard to the
3 2014 revenue requirement can be considered good regulatory practice and as to the precedent
4 that may be established.”

5 **Reference:** *Order No. P.U. 58 (2014), page 7, lines 33 – 37.*

6
7 Hydro has not presented evidence in this proceeding as to whether using a test year as a basis for
8 recovering losses or deficiencies is an acceptable regulatory practice or whether the practice has
9 been used in other jurisdictions.

10 **Reference:** *Transcript, November 19, 2015, page 35, line 20 to page 38, line 14.*

11
12 In carrying out its duties under the *Public Utilities Act*, the Board is required to apply tests which
13 are consistent with generally accepted sound public utility practice.

14 **Reference:** *Electrical Power Control Act, 1994, s. 4.*

15
16 A revenue deficiency is not a cost. It is the net financial result of a year of utility operation.
17 Hydro’s proposed recovery of the 2014 Revenue Deficiency is based on full recovery of Hydro’s
18 2014 forecast costs. Approval by the Board of full recovery by Hydro of the 2014 Revenue
19 Deficiency would effectively amount to a guarantee of Hydro’s 2014 rate of return. In
20 Newfoundland Power’s submission, such approval would not be consistent with the “regulative
21 and corrective” nature of the Board’s powers as referenced by the Newfoundland and Labrador
22 Court of Appeal. In Newfoundland Power’s view, it is difficult to understand how the deferred

1 recovery of a revenue deficiency from a prior year to recover the “incurred costs of operating a
2 utility” would not be “...a retroactive adjustment of the actions of management.”

3

4 **D.5 Costs Unsupported by Evidence in the 2014 Test Year**

5 *D.5.1 General*

6 Newfoundland Power submits that Hydro’s application for recovery of the proposed 2014
7 Revenue Deficiency is inconsistent with generally accepted regulatory practice, and should be
8 denied in its entirety. In the alternative, the evidence does not support recovery from customers
9 for the costs comprising the 2014 Revenue Deficiency.

10

11 Certain costs included in Hydro’s proposed 2014 test year are subject to the same evidentiary
12 shortcomings as the 2015 costs addressed in Section C of this Brief of Argument. The 2014 test
13 year costs which, in Newfoundland Power’s submission, ought not to be recovered by Hydro
14 total approximately \$64 million to \$67 million. If the Board determines that these 2014 costs
15 should not be recovered from customers, this would more than fully offset the 2014 Revenue
16 Deficiency and disentitle Hydro to any recovery from customers in respect of it.

17

18 Detailed submissions follow on 2014 test year costs unsupported by evidence.

19

20 *D.5.2 Unsupported Rate Base Items*

21 *D.5.2.1 General*

22 Hydro seeks approval for an average rate base of \$1,692.6 million for 2014. This represents an
23 increase of \$203.2 million over its 2007 approved rate base. This increase is largely driven by an

1 increase in net capital assets. Hydro seeks a 2014 return on average rate base of \$120.6 million
2 at a rate of return on rate base of 7.12%.

3 **Reference:** *Evidence, Section 3.4.1, page 3.20, Table 3.9; Section 3.3.6, page 3.17, Table 3.7.*

4
5 Hydro has overstated its 2014 average rate base. Accordingly, rate base adjustments similar to
6 those proposed in Section C of these written submissions are required.

7
8 The rate base adjustments will have corresponding effects on the return on rate base and
9 amortization. In this section, Hydro's estimates of return on rate base and amortization impacts
10 have been used when available. Otherwise, return on rate base impacts are estimated on the
11 basis of Hydro's proposed rate of return on rate base of 7.12%. Amortization impacts are
12 estimated on the basis of Hydro's average depreciation rate of 3.5%.

13 **Reference:** *TIR-NP-NLH-011, footnote 3.*

14
15 *D.5.2.1 Overstated Plant in Service*

16 For 2014, Hydro forecast additions to plant in service of \$239.0 million. Actual additions totaled
17 \$91 million. According to Hydro, the largest component of the \$148.0 variance was the
18 Holyrood CT at \$110.0 million. The remaining \$38.0 million appears to have been made up of
19 other planned additions either canceled or carried over to 2015 or later years.

20 **Reference:** *Grant Thornton Report, June 12, 2015, page 115, Table 87; TIR-NP-NLH-011;*
21 *NP-NLH-308; Undertaking 32.*

1 *Submission*

2 Newfoundland Power submits that a reduction in the 2014 average rate base and 2014 test year
3 revenue requirement is necessary on account of a \$148 million overstatement of plant in service.

4

5 Table D-1 shows the required reduction to the 2014 test year average rate base and revenue
6 requirement for overstated plant in service.

7

Table D-1
2014 Test Year
Overstated Plant in Service
(\$000s)

	<u>Rate Base</u>		<u>Revenue Requirement</u>		
	Year End	Average	Return on Rate Base	Amortization	Total
Holyrood CT	110,000	54,869	3,907	262	4,189
Incomplete/Underspent	37,971	18,985	1,296	664	1,960
Total	147,971	73,854	5,203	926	6,149

Reference: TIR-NLH-011; NP-NLH-308.

8

9 *D.5.2.2 Capital Cost Disallowances for Imprudence*

10 Liberty has recommended that the Board consider potential capital cost disallowances for 2014
11 totaling approximately \$10.9 million. For the reasons stated in its written submissions on the
12 Prudence Review, Newfoundland Power agrees with some of Liberty's findings. Hydro's
13 customers should not be burdened with costs which would not have arisen but for the imprudent
14 decisions or actions of Hydro.

15 *Reference: Liberty Report, July 6, 2015, page 44.*

1 *Submission*

2 Hydro's 2014 test year revenue requirement should be adjusted to reflect the cost implications of
3 its imprudent decisions and actions.

4

5 Table D-2 shows the reductions to average rate base and return on rate base related to 2014
6 capital cost disallowances advocated by Newfoundland Power in the Prudence Review.

7

Table D-2
2014 Test Year
Prudence Disallowances
(\$000s)

Project	Average Rate Base	Return on Rate Base
Western Avalon Tap Changer	725	52
Sunnyside Transformer	1,955	139
Holyrood/Sunnyside Breakers ¹	252	18
January 2013 Holyrood Repair	5,015	357
Total	7,947	566

Reference: NP-NLH-308; Liberty Report, pages ES-5 and 23.

8

9 *D.5.2.3 Rate Base Allowances*

10 Hydro's forecast for fuel inventory in 2014 was \$65.1 million. This forecast was overstated by
11 \$5.1 million in comparison with the 2014 actual amount of \$60.0 million.

12 **Reference:** Grant Thornton Report, June 12, 2015, page 29, Table 13.

¹ The average rate base amount of \$290,000 shown in NP-NLH-308 for the Holyrood and Sunnyside Breakers includes the Holyrood Unit 3 fan, which was found to be a prudent capital project by Liberty. The 2014 capital expenditure for this project was reported by Liberty to be \$76,407 (see page 23 of the Liberty Report). The average rate base impact of this amount is \$38,204 ($\$76,407 / 2$). The estimated average rate base related to the Holyrood and Sunnyside Breakers is \$251,796 ($290,000 - 38,204$). The return on rate base impact is estimated to be \$17,928 ($\$251,796 \times 7.12\%$).

- 1 *Submission*
- 2 Newfoundland Power submits that Hydro's 2014 average rate base should be reduced by \$5.1
- 3 million to account for the overstatement of Hydro's 2014 forecast fuel inventory.
- 4
- 5 Table D-3 shows the reductions to 2014 test year average rate base and return on rate base
- 6 related to rate base allowances.
- 7

Table D-3
2014 Test Year Average Rate Base
Rate Base Allowances
(\$000s)

	Average Rate Base	Return on Rate Base
Fuel Inventory	5,069	361
Total	5,069	361

Reference: *Grant Thornton Report, June 12, 2015, page 29,
Table 13; Table D-3.*

1 *D.5.2.4 Summary of Unsupported Rate Base Items*

2 Table D-4 summarizes the required reductions in average rate base and associated revenue
3 requirement impacts for the 2014 test year.

4

Table D-4
2014 Test Year Average Rate Base
Summary of Adjustments
(\$000s)

	Average Rate Base	Revenue Requirement
Overstated Plant in Service (<i>Table D-1</i>)	73,854	6,149
Prudence Disallowances (<i>Table D-2</i>)	7,947	566
Rate Base Allowances (<i>Table D-3</i>)	5,069	361
Total	86,870	7,076

5

6 *D.5.3 Unsupported Production Costs*7 *D.5.3.1 Holyrood Conversion Factor*

8 The No.6 fuel production costs for the forecast 2014 year were calculated at \$109.59 per barrel
9 using a forecast conversion factor of 588 kWh/bbl. The total No. 6 fuel production costs
10 included in the 2014 Test year were \$255,841. The impact of modifying the Holyrood
11 conversion factor from 630 kWh/bbl to 588 kWh/bbl, at the same fuel price, is \$17.0 million.

12 **Reference:** *Evidence, Section 3, Schedule II, page 1, line 10; NP-NLH-340.*

13

14 For the same reasons set out in Section C.2.2, Newfoundland Power submits that Hydro has not
15 proven that a modification to the existing Holyrood conversion factor is warranted for 2014.

1 *Submission*

2 Newfoundland Power submits that a reduction in Hydro's 2014 test year revenue requirement of
 3 \$17.0 million is necessary to reflect a Holyrood conversion factor of 630 kWh/bbl.

4

5 Table D-5 shows the reductions to 2014 test year revenue requirement related to fuel production.

6

Table D-5
2014 Test Year Revenue Requirement
Fuel Production Adjustments
(\$000s)

	Fuel
Holyrood Conversion Factor	17,000

Reference: NP-NLH-340.

7

8 ***D.5.4 Operating Costs***9 ***D.5.4.1 Operating Cost Disallowances for Imprudence***

10 In Liberty's review of prudence issues, Liberty indicated that Hydro had spent a total of \$13.4
 11 million that, but for imprudence, would have been avoided. Liberty subsequently acknowledged
 12 that the \$13.4 million should be reduced by approximately \$1.0 million to \$12.4 million.

13 ***Reference:*** *September 17, 2015 Reply of Liberty, page 15, lines 19-25; page 16, lines 19-26;*
 14 *and page 17, lines 1-15.*

15

16 For the reasons set out in Newfoundland Power's written submission on the Prudence Review,
 17 Newfoundland Power agrees with some of, but not all, of Liberty's recommendations regarding
 18 2014 operating cost disallowances related to Hydro's imprudence.

1 *Submission*

2 Newfoundland Power submits that there should be a \$10.3 million to \$11 million adjustment to
 3 Hydro's 2014 test year revenue requirement on account of disallowed operating costs.

4
 5 Table D-6 summarizes the 2014 Hydro operating costs that Newfoundland Power submits should
 6 be disallowed by the Board.

7

Table D-6
2014 Operating Costs
Summary of Prudence Disallowances
 (\$000s)

Cost Arising from Maintenance Deficiencies	1,085
January 2014 Supply Costs	1,000 – 1,700
Professional Services Costs	1,905
Overtime Costs	3,584
Salary Transfers	511
Holyrood Unit 1 Failure	2,220
Total	10,305 – 11,005

Reference: Newfoundland Power Written Submission – Prudence Review, Table 4; Table 6; Table 8.

8

9 Newfoundland Power's written submission on the Prudence Review contains its detailed position
 10 on each of these projects.

11

12 *D.5.4.2 Overstated Human Resources Costs*

13 Hydro acknowledges that vacancies can occur from time to time and that an allowance or
 14 adjustment to workforce budgets should be made in computing test year costs. It is Hydro's
 15 practice to adjust for such vacancies by way of an adjustment to the salary and benefits costs

1 included in the test year. Hydro's evidence is that average annual salary and benefit costs per
2 FTE for 2014 is \$82,000.

3 **Reference:** IC-NLH-006 (Revision 2), Table 2.

4

5 It is unclear from the evidence what vacancy adjustment Hydro has applied to the 2014 test year.

6 There is evidence on the record indicating that Hydro's 2014 test year reflects a vacancy of 40
7 FTEs. There is other evidence on the record that indicates the 2014 test year reflects a vacancy
8 adjustment of 20 FTEs.

9 **Reference:** CA-NLH-104 (Revision 1), page 3, lines 13-18; Undertaking 145, page 1.

10

11 The actual number of vacancies experienced in 2014 was 52. A vacancy adjustment of either 20
12 or 40 FTEs is insufficient. Hydro's Human Resources costs are therefore overstated. A vacancy
13 adjustment is necessary to reflect the understatement of vacancies by between 12 and 32 FTEs.

14 **Reference:** NP-NLH-310.

15

16 *Submission*

17 Newfoundland Power submits that Hydro's 2014 test year revenue requirement should be
18 reduced by between \$1.0 million and \$2.7 million to reflect an appropriate vacancy adjustment.²

19

20 *D.5.4.3 Intercompany Charges*

21 For the reasons set out in Section C 2.3 under the heading Intercompany Charges, Hydro's 2014
22 test year revenue requirement should be reduced to correct the understatement of service charges

² At 12 FTE vacancies: $\$82,000 \times 12 = \$984,000$. At 32 FTE vacancies: $\$82,000 \times 32 = \$2,624,000$.

1 Hydro recovers from its affiliates and to reflect a more equitable allocation of common services
 2 costs.

3
 4 *Submission*

5 Newfoundland Power submits that the appropriate reduction for 2014 is shown in Table D-7.

6

Table D-7
2014 Test Year Revenue Requirement Adjustments
Intercompany Charges
(\$000s)

Fully burdened costs	106
Allocation method ³	882
Total	988

Reference: *Undertaking 151; NP-NLH-204.*

7

8 *D.5.4.4 GRA and Board Related Costs*

9 Under the heading of Professional Services, Hydro seeks to recover a total of \$10.6 million after
 10 cost recoveries from affiliates in the 2014 test year. This amount includes \$3.5 million in GRA
 11 and Board Related Costs. As indicated in Section C.2.3, Hydro's average annual GRA and
 12 Board Related Costs were in the range of \$1.5 million from the 2007-2014 period.

13 **Reference:** *Evidence, Section 2.4.1, page 2.39. Table 2.7; Grant Thornton Report, June 12,*
 14 *2015, page 80, Tables 64 and 65.*

15

16 Hydro's 2014 actual GRA and Board related costs exceeded \$3.8 million. There is no evidence
 17 that these costs were reasonably incurred. In 2014, Hydro notified the Board of its intention to
 18 file the Amended Application, suspending the hearing process for the Original Application one

³ Allocation method: See NP-NLH-204, page 2 of 2. Scenario (i) of \$8,919,000 less Scenario (ii) of \$8,037,500 = \$881,500.

1 month before the start of the scheduled public hearing. Hydro's conduct of the Original
 2 Application and the Amended Application resulted in significant duplication of effort. In
 3 addition, Hydro filed two unsuccessful interim rate applications, which were denied by the Board
 4 due to lack of clarity or insufficient evidence. The above-average GRA and Board related costs
 5 incurred by Hydro in 2014 should not be borne by rate payers.

6 **Reference:** Order No. P.U. 13 (2014), page 9, lines 1-6; Order No. P.U.39 (2014), page 10,
 7 lines 18-22.

8
 9 *Submission*

10 Newfoundland Power submits that Hydro's 2014 test year revenue requirement should be
 11 reduced by \$2 million to reflect reasonable recovery of GRA and Board related costs.

12
 13 *D.5.4.5 Summary of Operating Costs*

14 Table D-8 summarizes the proposed adjustment to revenue requirement for the 2014 test year for
 15 operating costs.

16

Table D-8
2014 Test Year Revenue Requirement
Summary of Operating Costs Adjustments
(\$000s)

	Operating
Prudence Disallowances (<i>Table D-6</i>)	10,305 – 11,005
Overstated Human Resources Costs (<i>page D-15</i>)	984 - 2,624
Intercompany Charges (<i>Table D-7</i>)	988
GRA and Board Related Costs (<i>page D-17</i>)	2,000
Total	14,277 – 16,617

1 **D.5.5 Other Costs**

2 **D.5.5.1 Debt Guarantee Fee**

3 The debt guarantee fee included in Hydro's 2014 test year is \$3.7 million. For the reasons set
4 out in Section C, Newfoundland Power submits that Hydro is not legally obliged to pay a debt
5 guarantee fee. On that basis, Hydro's 2014 test year revenue requirement should be reduced by
6 \$3.7 million.

7 **Reference:** *Evidence, Section 3.5.3, page 3.32, Table 3.13.*

8

9 If the Board is satisfied that payment of a debt guarantee fee is in the interests of ratepayers, the
10 Board should consider whether the proposed fee is a reasonable one. In Section C.2.4.1
11 Newfoundland Power makes submissions regarding a more reasonable approach to calculating
12 the debt guarantee fee.

13

14 Hydro provided a calculation of the debt guarantee fee for 2015 based on the more reasonable
15 approach set out in Section C. No such calculation was provided for 2014. Hydro has not
16 proven that the debt guarantee fee reflected in the 2014 test year is reasonable.

17

18 **Submission**

19 Newfoundland Power submits that the debt guarantee fee is unenforceable and should not be
20 recovered from Hydro's customers. Hydro's 2014 test year revenue requirement should
21 therefore be reduced by \$3.7 million.

1 *D.5.5.2 Asset Retirement Obligations*

2 In the Settlement Agreement the parties agreed that Hydro's proposal to include depreciation and
 3 accretion expenses associated with Asset Retirement Obligations in 2014 should be reduced from
 4 \$3.1 million to \$2.6 million in the 2014 Test Year. This \$0.5 million reduction reflects the
 5 exclusion of certain construction and selective decommissioning costs at the Holyrood
 6 generating plant. These costs will be incurred to the benefit of customers subsequent to the
 7 Labrador-Island Interconnection, and Hydro may apply for recovery of such costs in the future.

8 **Reference:** *Consent 1, page 2.*

9

10 *Submission*

11 Newfoundland Power submits that the Board should reduce Hydro's 2014 test year revenue
 12 requirement by \$0.5 million to reflect the reduction related to Asset Retirement Obligations
 13 agreed in the Settlement Agreement.

14

15 Table D-9 summarizes the reductions to 2014 test year revenue requirement related to other
 16 costs.

17

Table D-9
2014 Test Year Revenue Requirement
Summary of Other Costs Adjustments
(\$000s)

	Other
Debt Guarantee Fee	3,680
Asset Retirement Obligations	500
Total	4,180

Reference: *PUB-NLH-060, Revision 1, Attachment 1;*
Consent 1, page 2.

1 **D.5.6 Return on Equity**

2 For the reasons set out in Section D.3.1, Hydro is not entitled to a target return on equity of
3 8.80% for the 2014 test year. The return on Hydro’s 2014 adjusted rate base should be limited to
4 Hydro’s marginal cost of debt, as approved in Order No. P.U. 8 (2007).

5
6 The impact of increasing Hydro’s return on equity in the 2013 test year revenue requirement on
7 which the Original Application was based was in the order of \$20.9 million. The impact of
8 increasing Hydro’s return on equity in the 2015 test year revenue requirement on which the
9 Amended Application is based is in the order of \$23.1 million. There is no evidence on the
10 record of the impact of an 8.80% target return on equity for the 2014 test year. The mid-point of
11 the 2013 and 2015 impacts of \$22.0 million represents a reasonable indicative impact.

12 **Reference:** PUB-NLH-056, Attachment 1, line 22; PUB-NLH-056 (Revision 1), Attachment 1,
13 line 22.
14

15 **Submission**

16 Newfoundland Power submits that Hydro’s return on rate base for the 2014 test year should be
17 calculated based on a target rate of return on equity equal to Hydro’s marginal cost of debt. For
18 indicative purposes, the necessary reduction in Hydro’s 2014 test year revenue requirement is in
19 the order of \$22 million.

1 **D.5.7 Summary of 2014 Test Year Adjustments**

2 Table D-10 summarizes the required adjustments to revenue requirement for the 2014 test year.

3

Table D-10
2014 Test Year Revenue Requirement
Summary of Adjustments
(\$000s)

Rate Base Items (Table D-4)		
Overstated Plant in Service	6,149	
Prudence Disallowances	566	
Rate Base Allowances	361	7,076
Production Costs (Table D-5)		
Holyrood Conversion Factor		17,000
Operating Costs (Table D-8)		
Prudence Disallowances	10,305 – 11,005	
Overstated Human Resources Costs	984 – 2,624	
Intercompany Charges	988	
GRA and Board Related Costs	2,000	14,277 – 16,617
Other Costs (Table D-9)		
Debt Guarantee Fee	3,680	
Asset Retirement Obligation	500	4,180
Return on Equity (Page D-20)		
		22,000
Total		64,533 – 66,873

1 **E. REGULATORY MECHANISMS**

2 **E.1 Energy Supply Cost Variance Deferral Account**

3 Hydro has proposed that the Board establish an Energy Supply Cost Variance Deferral Account
4 to insulate Hydro from annual variances in supply purchase costs on the Island Interconnected
5 System. The proposed account would apply to variations in (i) power purchases from wind
6 generation, (ii) power purchases from CBPP, (iii) power purchases from hydraulic generation,
7 (iv) diesel generation, and (v) Gas Turbine generation. The proposed deferral account would
8 only address variances from forecast exceeding the proposed Cost Variance Threshold of
9 \pm \$500,000. Disposition of any annual balance is to be dealt with by application to the Board.

10 **Reference:** *Amended Application, Volume 1, pages 3.48-3.50.*

11

12 The evidence reveals no volatility in price for any of Hydro's proposed power purchases. Long-
13 term contracts with fixed components are in place for wind purchases and purchases from CBPP,
14 with the variable components of these contracts limited to changes in the consumer price index.

15

16 The price of hydraulic purchases from the Exploits generation assets is fixed until 2016. Those
17 assets are owned by the Province. Hydro should not be permitted to recover any cost variance
18 related to a price controlled by a related entity without first submitting those costs to a
19 reasonableness test. While Hydro indicated that there was some variability in the volume of
20 purchases, there was no evidence that the volatility is so great as to justify insulating Hydro from
21 any forecast risk.

22 **Reference:** *Transcript, November 18, page 137, line 5 to page 138, line 4.*

1 Hydro's main concern regarding supply related purchases appears to be supply cost volatility
2 related to combustion turbine usage. In the 2015 Cost Deferral Application, Hydro stated that its
3 energy supply costs related to gas turbine usage (largely related to the new Holyrood CT) were
4 forecast to be \$7.1 million higher than the 2015 Test Year forecast. Other energy supply costs
5 were essentially tracking in line with the initial forecast.

6 **References:** *Transcript September 23, 2015, page 78, lines 2-12; 2015 Cost Deferral*
7 *Application, Schedule 3, Appendix C.*
8

9 Hydro calculates that operation of the Holyrood CT in the range of 30-85 hours would, by itself,
10 exceed the proposed \pm \$500,000 Cost Variance Threshold.

11 **References:** *Undertaking 59.*
12

13 The deferral account as proposed would require Hydro to file an application, no later than March
14 1st each year, to request disposition of any balance. Operation of the CT is subject to the
15 judgment of Hydro. Hydro has acknowledged that an application for disposition of any cost
16 variance should include evidence as to the circumstances of its operation in the prior year.

17 **Reference:** *Transcript October 20, 2015, page 140, lines 8-17.*
18

19 Newfoundland Power acknowledges that the Holyrood CT is critical to the system and that there
20 should not be a disincentive to its prudent use for system reliability. Hydro should be permitted
21 to recover costs associated with the operation of the Holyrood CT by means of an Energy Supply
22 Cost Variance Deferral Account if, and only if, the costs are shown to be reasonable in the
23 circumstances.

1 *Submission*

2 Newfoundland Power submits that Hydro's proposed Energy Supply Cost Variance Deferral
3 Account should be approved only in relation to supply cost variances arising from the operation
4 of the Holyrood CT.

5

6 **E.2. Isolated Systems Supply Cost Variance Deferral Account**

7 Hydro has proposed that the Board establish an Isolated Systems Supply Cost Variance Deferral
8 Account to insulate Hydro from annual variances in supply costs on the Isolated Systems. The
9 proposed deferral account would provide for recovery of isolated system supply cost variances
10 from forecast exceeding a variance threshold of \pm \$500,000. Disposition of any annual balance is
11 to be dealt with by application to the Board.

12 **Reference:** *Amended Application, Volume 1, pages 3.46-3.48.*

13

14 Hydro has produced evidence indicating volatility in the price of diesel fuel over the last several
15 years with variances in the range of \$0.3 million to \$6.0 million. Such variances may be
16 characterized as uncontrollable, although it is appropriate that Hydro attempt to mitigate against
17 variability with improved forecasting.

18 **Reference:** *Amended Application, Volume 1, Section 3.8.2, page 3.47, lines 11-12.*

19

20 *Submission*

21 Newfoundland Power submits that Hydro's proposed Isolated Systems Supply Cost Variance
22 Cost Deferral Account should be approved.

1 **E.3. Holyrood Conversion Rate Deferral Account**

2 Hydro has proposed a Holyrood Conversion Rate Deferral Account to provide for recovery of
3 cost variances resulting from variations from the test year Holyrood fuel conversion rate.

4 Transfers to the proposed Holyrood Conversion Rate Deferral Account are not subject to a
5 variance threshold. The proposed deferral account would provide for recovery of all variances
6 from the test year forecast of Holyrood fuel supply costs.

7 **Reference:** *Amended Application, Section 2, Schedule IX.*

8

9 In Newfoundland Power's submission, the evidence does not establish that there will be
10 significant future volatility in the Holyrood fuel conversion rate such as would justify protection
11 from inaccurate forecasting. Hydro has not commissioned any comprehensive studies on the
12 factors which could impact the Holyrood fuel conversion rate, and has not established it is
13 beyond Hydro's control.

14 **Reference:** *Transcript, September 23, 2015, page 91, line 14 to page 94, line 4.*

15

16 Hydro undertakes a variety of activities on a monthly and annual basis to operate Holyrood more
17 efficiently. The proposed deferral account could remove the financial incentive to operate the
18 plant as efficiently as possible.

19

20 *Submission*

21 Newfoundland Power submits that the evidence concerning Hydro's proposed Holyrood
22 Conversion Rate Deferral Account does not justify its adoption at this time. Accordingly, the
23 account should not be approved.

1 **E.4 Return on Equity Automatic Adjustment Mechanism**

2 By Order in Council, the Board is directed, in calculating Hydro's return on rate base, to set the
3 same target return on equity as was most recently set for Newfoundland Power.

4 **Reference:** OC2009-063.

5

6 Newfoundland Power's 2016 general rate application is scheduled for hearing by the Board
7 commencing in March 2016. The Board will be considering Newfoundland Power's target rate
8 of return on equity at or about the time of issuance of its general rate order in this proceeding.

9

10 To ensure that the Order in Council is given full effect in these circumstances, it would be
11 reasonable for Hydro's target rate of return on equity to be changed by way of an automatic
12 adjustment mechanism in the event that Newfoundland Power's target rate is changed. Hydro
13 concedes that such an order would be within the jurisdiction of the Board.

14 **Reference:** Order-in-Council OC2009-063; Transcript November 16, 2015, page 71, line 20
15 to page 73, line 10.

16

17 *Submission*

18 Newfoundland Power submits that the evidence supports the Board's implementation of an
19 automatic mechanism to adjust Hydro's target rate of return on equity when Newfoundland
20 Power's target rate of return on equity changes.

1 **F. COST OF SERVICE**

2 **F.1 General**

3 The Cost of Service issues associated with the Amended Rate Application were largely
4 addressed in the two settlement agreements signed by the parties. The significant issues
5 remaining to be considered by the Board include the allocation methods related to (i) the Rural
6 Deficit, (ii) specifically assigned operations and maintenance (“O&M”) costs and (iii) the Load
7 Variation Component of the Rate Stabilization Plan (“RSP”).

8

9 **F.2 Rural Deficit Allocation**

10 The Rural Deficit is essentially the difference between the cost of providing electrical service to,
11 and the revenue received from, customers of Hydro on Isolated Diesel Systems, the L’Anse au
12 Loup System and the Island Interconnected System. The Rural Deficit is projected to be in the
13 order of \$64.1 million for the 2015 Test Year, which is approximately \$30 million higher than it
14 was in 1995.

15 **Reference:** *Evidence, Volume 2, Exhibit 13, page 3; PUB-NP-005, Table 1.*

16

17 The Rural Deficit is currently allocated between Newfoundland Power and the customers of the
18 Labrador Interconnected System using a Unit Cost Method. This allocation method was
19 recommended by the Board following the comprehensive review of this issue in the 1992
20 Generic Cost of Service hearings. This method involves an equal commodity approach which
21 divides the deficit between the two groups on the basis of (i) demand (ii) energy, and (iii)
22 customer cost.

23 **Reference:** *Pre-filed Evidence of Larry Brockman, June 4, 2015, page 12, lines 6-16.*

1 Hydro proposes a change in allocation method from the Unit Cost Method. Hydro’s proposal
2 purports to be rooted in a “fairness assessment” which evaluates fairness on the basis of whether
3 the customers of Newfoundland Power and Hydro’s customers on the Labrador Interconnected
4 System pay the same amount on a per customer basis. This proposal was not included in the
5 Original Application.

6 **Reference:** *Evidence, Volume 2, Exhibit 13, page 3; Transcript, October 5, 2015, page 197,*
7 *lines 17-21.*
8

9 There is no truly fair way to allocate the Rural Deficit, as the costs are not causally related to the
10 customers funding it.

11 **Reference:** *Pre-filed Evidence of Larry Brockman, June 4, 2015, page 4, lines 14-15.*
12

13 Hydro’s proposal is to allocate the Rural Deficit based on the revenue requirement method. This
14 proposal would result in a change in the amount allocated to Newfoundland Power in the 2015
15 test year from \$56.9 million to \$61.7 million. The revenue requirement method of allocation was
16 considered and rejected by the Board in the 1992 Generic Cost of Service report. It was the
17 evidence of Newfoundland Power’s cost of service expert, Mr. Brockman, who also testified at
18 the 1992 Generic Cost of Service hearing, that none of the essential underpinnings of the Board’s
19 1992 recommendation have changed.

20 **Reference:** *Grant Thornton Report, June 12, 2015, page 132, Table 99; Pre-filed Evidence of*
21 *Larry Brockman, June 4, 2015, page 4, lines 5-11 and page 17, line 24 to page*
22 *18, line 5.*
23

24 Under the existing Unit Cost method of allocation, the Labrador Interconnected System
25 customers pay more, on a per customer basis, than Newfoundland Power. This is largely a result
26 of the higher per customer energy consumption on the Labrador Interconnected system. These

1 circumstances existed in 1992. This would have resulted in Labrador Interconnected customers
2 paying more, on a per customer basis, had Hydro implemented the Board’s recommendations
3 prior to 2001. The Board clearly understood that the methodologies considered could have
4 varying impacts. However, in its report, the Board indicated that matters of impact could be
5 dealt with by rate design.

6 **Reference:** *Evidence, Volume 1, Section 4.3.1, page 4.8; PUB-NP-005, page 2, Table 2; and*
7 *response to Request for Information PUB-NLH-113, Attachment 1, pages 60, 62*
8 *and 65.*
9

10 In determining whether or not the allocation methodology should be changed, it is important for
11 the Board to consider the circumstances of all of the funding parties. This includes the fact that
12 Newfoundland Power relies on a combination of hydroelectric and more costly thermal energy to
13 supply its customers. Labrador Interconnected customers have the benefit of hydroelectric
14 energy as their sole source of energy. Under the revenue requirement method, Newfoundland
15 Power would be burdened with a higher portion of the Rural Deficit because it already pays
16 higher rates on a per kWh basis due to the mix of supply sources serving their customers.

17 **Reference:** *PUB-NLH-113, Attachment 1, page 64.*
18

19 The Board should also consider whether this is the right time to revisit the issue. Interconnection
20 with Labrador is imminent. There is evidence that this could result in uniform rates for
21 customers of the two interconnected systems. Any alteration in methodology in the short-term
22 may result in “taking the Labrador Interconnected rates in the wrong direction”.

23 **Reference:** *Pre-Filed Evidence, Larry Brockman, June 4, 2015, page 16, lines 9-11.*

1 It is Newfoundland Power’s submission that Hydro’s proposal to modify the Rural Deficit
2 allocation methodology should be denied and the portion of the Rural Deficit proposed to be
3 allocated to Newfoundland Power should be adjusted downward accordingly.

4
5 Hydro has committed to completing a number of major reviews, including embedded cost and
6 marginal cost studies, in preparation for interconnection. Once those reviews are complete, the
7 Board will have more current information on marginal costs on the electricity system. This
8 would provide a better evidentiary basis for reconsideration of the Rural Deficit allocation
9 methodology.

10
11 Should the Board determine it is appropriate to limit the rate impact to the customers of the
12 Labrador Interconnected system associated with the Rural Deficit in the interim, the Board
13 could, instead of changing the allocation methodology, determine an appropriate cap for the
14 overall rate increase to Labrador Interconnected customers.

15 **Reference:** *PUB-NP-009, lines 12-17.*

16
17 *Submission*

18 Newfoundland Power submits that Hydro’s proposal to change the Rural Deficit allocation
19 methodology should not be approved.

1 **F.3 Specifically Assigned O&M Charges**

2 Hydro specifically assigns O&M charges by allocating forecast costs amongst its customers
3 based on the original cost of plant in service. This has been the approved methodology for many
4 years.

5
6 In its pre-filed evidence, Vale took issue with Hydro's method of allocating specifically assigned
7 O&M charges on the basis that the approach fails to account for the time value of money.

8 Specifically, Vale's expert witness, Mr. Dean, argued that this approach results in inequitable
9 allocations to Vale because the majority of the plant specifically assigned to Vale is newer plant.

10 It was Mr. Dean's assertion that newer plant should theoretically attract less O&M expense.

11 There is no clear evidence on the record that this is the case. In August of 2011, Vale was
12 clearly informed of the applicable methodology, and accepted the assignment of all transmission
13 and terminal plant serving its Long Harbour facility on that basis.

14 **Reference:** *Undertaking 47, Attachment 1.*

15
16 Mr. Dean has recommended that the allocation procedure be modified such that all plant in
17 service be restated to 2015 dollars, instead of original dollars. However, he was unable to
18 provide any evidence that such an indexing approach has been applied to the assignment of
19 O&M charges in any other jurisdiction.

20 **Reference:** *Transcript October 1, 2015, page 69, line 9 to page 74, line 4.*

21
22 As a practical approach to the issue, Newfoundland Power submits it would be appropriate for
23 the Board to consider any such changes to the allocation of specifically assigned O&M after

1 completion of Hydro's embedded cost and rate design reviews, which are already underway. At
2 that time, a more comprehensive evidentiary basis for Vale's proposed change may be brought
3 forward for the Board's consideration.

4

5 *Submission*

6 Newfoundland Power submits that the current methodology of allocating specifically assigned
7 O&M costs should not be changed at this time.

8

9 **F.4. Load Variation Component of the RSP**

10 Hydro proposes changes to the Load Variation Component of the Rate Stabilization Plan rules to
11 reflect an energy allocation approach, similar to the manner in which fuel price variation is
12 allocated. The Rate Stabilization rules presently allocate cost effects to the customer group that
13 caused the load variation. The parties to the Settlement Agreement have agreed that if the Load
14 Variation Component is maintained in the RSP, it should be allocated on the basis of customer
15 energy ratios. The Industrial Customer group has suggested that the Load Variation component
16 should be eliminated.

17 **Reference:** *Consent 1, paragraph 16.*

18

19 Hydro proposes that the Load Variation balance that has accumulated in the RSP since
20 September 1, 2013 should also be allocated on the basis of customer energy ratios. This balance
21 was segregated in the RSP pending disposition of the Board in accordance with the terms of an
22 Order in Council.

23 **Reference:** *OC 2013-089; Order No. P.U. 40 (2013).*

1 The consensus as to the allocation method in the Settlement Agreement is consistent with the
2 position of Hydro, and that of the Board’s cost of service expert, Dr. Wilson, that the customer
3 energy ratio approach would result in a more equitable allocation of the Load Variation balance
4 as “load variation has an impact on Holyrood energy costs for all customers.”

5 **Reference:** *Report of J. W. Wilson and Associates, June 1, 2015, page 33.*

6

7 There is no principled basis or evidence supporting the allocation of the segregated balance in
8 the Load Variation Component of the RSP on any basis other than the customer energy ratio
9 approach.

10

11 *Submission*

12 Newfoundland Power submits that Hydro’s proposal to allocate the Load Variation Component
13 of the RSP on the basis of customer energy ratios should be approved. The same allocation
14 methodology should be applied to the segregated balance that has accumulated in the Load
15 Variation Component of the RSP since September 1, 2013.