1	SEC	TION	N 3: FINANCE/DEMAND MANAGEMENT INCENTIVE ACCOUNT
2 3	Q.	Re	ference: NLH-NP-073, NLH-NP-074, and NLH-NP-075
4			Please update Table 2 in Newfoundland Power's response to NLH-NP-075 for
5		,	2013–2023 to include:
6			i) Test Year Demand Cost and Actual Demand Cost;
7			ii) Test Year Energy Purchases and Actual Energy Purchases;
8			iii) Test Year Billing Demand and Actual Billing Demand;
9			iv) Demand Supply Cost Variance;
10			v) Demand Management Incentive ("DMI") threshold (show the threshold as a
11			positive or negative impact on net income); and
12			vi) Amount credited or charged to customers through the DMI Account.
13		h)	Does the current operation of the DMI Account provide an incentive for
14		U)	Newfoundland Power to undertake reasonable initiatives to minimize peak
15			demand?
16		c)	Would Newfoundland Power support a change to its DMI Account to specifically
17		-)	incentivize the company to meet or exceed demand management activities within
18			its control such as voltage management, customer curtailment, and Conservation
19			and Demand Management activities? Why or why not?
20			
21	A.	a)	See Attachment A for the requested information.
22			
23		b)	Both the current and proposed definition of the DMI Account provide an incentive to
24			Newfoundland Power to undertake reasonable initiatives to minimize peak demand.
25			The proposed change in the incentive threshold to \pm \$500,000 is intended to recognize
26			that the Company's ability to reduce its purchased power demand costs from those
27			included in customer rates has become more limited since the establishment of the
28			DMI Account. This is largely reflective of peak savings related to Newfoundland
29			Power's demand initiatives being incorporated into the test year demand cost forecast
30			used to set customer rates as outlined in section 3.4.2 Demand Management Incentive
31			of the 2025/2026 General Rate Application.
32			While shout town understing in demond costs from these determined in the test war
33 34			While short-term reductions in demand costs from those determined in the test year (e.g. 2023 actual vs. 2023 test year) are limited, the Company continues to focus on
34 35			managing its demand costs to reduce overall costs for customers. ¹
35 36			managing its demand costs to reduce overall costs for customers.
37		റ	Newfoundland Power's proposed DMI Account definition does provide an incentive
38		0)	for the Company to continue to undertake these initiatives. ²

¹

See the response to Request for Information PUB-NP-074. See the 2025/2026 General Rate Application, Volume 1: Application, Company Evidence and Exhibits, 3.4.2 2 Demand Management Incentive for a fulsome discussion on this matter.

Demand Management Incentive Account

Newfoundland Power Inc.

Demand Management Incentive Account 2013 to 2023 (\$000s unless otherwise stated)

	Demand Costs		Energy Purchases (GWh)		Billing Demand (kW)		Demand Supply	DMI	Net Charge or
	Test Year	Actual	Test Year	Actual	Test Year	Actual	Cost Variance	Threshold	(Credit) to DMI
2013	58,219	59,163	5,678.4	5,678.1	1,212,890	1,232,566	965	582	272
2014	59,399	58,818	5,753.2	5,816.6	1,237,480	1,225,376	(1,221)	(594)	(446)
2015	59,399	60,686	5,753.2	5,877.4	1,237,480	1,264,289	59	594	-
2016	66,071	64,919	5,918.0	5,868.1	1,274,510	1,252,299	(587)	(661)	-
2017	66,283	68,272	5,908.9	5,828.7	1,278,610	1,316,974	2,856	728	1,490
2018	72,801	71,509	5,908.9	5,769.0	1,277,211	1,254,547	462	728	-
2019	71,958	74,639	5,800.7	5,741.9	1,262,414	1,309,458	3,445	758	1,881
2020	75,455	75,063	5,804.2	5,604.3	1,257,591	1,251,052	2,186	755	1,002
2021	75,455	75,063	5,804.2	5,567.3	1,257,591	1,251,052	2,672	755	1,342
2022	75,063	75,184	5,572.8	5,650.4	1,251,052	1,253,062	(904)	(751)	(107)
2023	75,063	80,681	5,545.9	5,806.3	1,251,052	1,344,691	2,148	751	978